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ABSTRACT 
The goal of this paper is to raise the level of discourse surrounding paradigms by drawing out a 
number of observations on how paradigms are interpreted in the IS field, and to reclaim the 
transformative potential of the Kuhnian paradigm concept in encouraging novel, interesting and 
relevant research and theorizing. After positioning the contribution of the Kuhnian paradigm and 
its significance in the philosophy of science, we describe the negative impacts of a research 
ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ?ƐƉƌĞŽĐĐƵƉĂƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚƚŚĞepistemological sense of paradigm, which ignited within 
the organizational sciences ĚĞĐĂĚĞƐŽĨƵŶŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇ “ƉĂƌĂĚŝŐŵǁĂƌƐ ?ĂŶĚa misplaced focus on 
methodology. We show how this epistemological rendering of paradigm, which is adopted by the 
IS field, differs from the opinions of well-known critics of Kuhn and how this view obscures the 
<ƵŚŶŝĂŶƉĂƌĂĚŝŐŵ ?ƐƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůĨŽƌŝŶŶŽǀĂƚŝǀĞƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ? To provide valuable insights into these 
issues, we introduce DĂƐƚĞƌŵĂŶ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ<ƵŚŶ ?ƐŵŽĚĞů ?ǁŚŝĐŚ Kuhn himself endorses, 
and unpack the paradigm concept into its metaphysical, sociological and artefactual 
components. Using DĂƐƚĞƌŵĂŶ ?Ɛ interpretation to highlight the primary meaning of Kuhn's 
paradigm concept as model problem-solution and exemplar, we describe how this multifaceted 
transformative view of paradigm benefits the IS field. 
Keywords: Information Systems (IS) theory, IS philosophy, creativity, IS research methods, Kuhn, 
paradigm, positivism, interpretivism.  
Introduction 
The goal of this Research Perspective article is to raise the level of discourse surrounding the 
concept of paradigm in the information systems (IS) field, and reclaim the transformative 
potential of the Kuhnian paradigm towards engendering more novel, interesting, and relevant 
research and theorizing. In the organization sciences, Alvesson and Sandberg (2013b) place the 
blame for the lack of innovative and influential research in the management discipline on the 
 2 
dominance of  “incremental gap-spotting research ? (p. 128). Other organization science scholars 
point to excessive borrowing (Oswick, et al., 2011), and exclusionary polemical tendencies that 
favor specific types of positivist and functionalist research (Grey, 2010). Similar concerns, voicing 
the need to develop research that are more forward-looking, influential and socially relevant, 
have also occupied the attention of IS scholars (Agarwal & Lucas Jr., 2005; Applegate, 1999; 
Benbasat & Zmud, 1999; Grover, 2013; Grover & Lyytinen, 2015; Grover, et al., 2008; 
Hirschheim & Klein, 2003; Klein & Hirschheim, 2008). These inter-linked issues are all related to 
how research is undertaken and, in the most inclusive sense, concerns how certain approaches 
towards research dominate over others  “to the detriment of intellectual innovation ? (Grey, 
2010, p. 128). In order to overcome these problems in the organization sciences, Alvesson and 
Sandberg (2014, p. 967-969) propose moving away from  “boxed-in ? research towards  “box-
breaking ? and  “box-transcending ? research. 
We argue that one of the forceƐŚŽůĚŝŶŐďĂĐŬ “ďŽǆ-ďƌĞĂŬŝŶŐ ?ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚŝŶ/^ĐĂŶďĞƚƌĂĐĞĚƚŽan 
over-ĂƌĐŚŝŶŐ ? “ďŽǆĞĚ-ŝŶ ? view of paradigms in IS as epistemological choices which take both the 
organizational sciences and IS fields away from ƚŚĞ<ƵŚŶŝĂŶƉĂƌĂĚŝŐŵ ?ƐƚƌĂŶƐĨŽƌŵĂƚŝǀĞ
potential. This over-arching epistemological view of the paradigm concept, which tends to be 
exclusionary, overemphasizes ƚŚĞƉĂƌĂĚŝŐŵ ?Ɛmetaphysical component, primarily its 
epistemological implications, over ƚŚĞƉĂƌĂĚŝŐŵ ?Ɛ sociological and conceptual components. 
Based on our analysis of paradigms, we recommend that the IS community abandon this 
practice of classifying, designing and evaluating research based primarily on its epistemology, 
and to adopt a more transformative interpretation of the paradigm that incorporates all of its 
metaphysical, sociological and conceptual components.  
The study proceeds in the following manner. First, ǁĞƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ<ƵŚŶ ?ƐǁŽƌŬs and the significance 
of the paradigm concept within the history of the development of knowledge. We then trace the 
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development of the paradigm concept and how it was appropriated by the sociological and 
organizational sciences in a primarily epistemological sense triggering unnecessary paradigm 
wars and holding back progress. We explain that this epistemological sense of the Kuhnian 
paradigm is only one part of a larger multifaceted picture of the paradigm. To reinstate the 
ŽƚŚĞƌĐŽŵƉŽŶĞŶƚƐŽĨƚŚĞ<ƵŚŶŝĂŶƉĂƌĂĚŝŐŵ ?ǁĞƵƐĞDĂƐƚĞƌŵĂŶ ?Ɛanalysis ŽĨ<ƵŚŶ ?Ɛuse of the 
term paradigm and subsequently highlight the parĂĚŝŐŵ ?ƐƚƌĂŶƐĨŽƌŵĂƚŝǀĞƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂů ? In the 
second half of the paper, we call for a return to this transformative view of the paradigm and 
explain the benefits of guiding research using its metaphysical, sociological and conceptual 
senses rather than on its epistemological rendering. We conclude by arguing that the 
multifaceted Kuhnian paradigm is more capable of uncovering hidden assumptions, more 
inclusive of alternative views, and consequently engenders pluralism, innovation and creativity, 
contrary to the received view of the Kuhnian paradigm in IS. Notwithstanding all of these 
purported advantages, we emphasize that our Research Perspective is one of many possible 
directions by which IS research could be viewed and consequently enhanced, and we do not 
claim that it is either the primary nor the only way forward for the IS field. 
<ƵŚŶ ?Ɛ>ĞŐĂĐǇ and The Structure of Scientific Revolutions  
We begin by emphasizing the critical role of the philosophy of science in enhancing research. 
The scope of the philosophy of science addresses not only the goals of research but also 
whether such research qualifies as being scientific, for it deals with what science is, how it works 
and the justifications through which we build our knowledge. Questions about what phenomena 
a discipline is actually studying; what theoretical foundations inform the discipline about its 
object of study; what relations these theoretical principles have with each other and theories in 
other domains; and what methods and values can be used to guide the research, are all 
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philosophical questions that often become the object of heated debates amongst the members 
of any research community. 
One of the most influential philosophical treatises that addresses these concerns ŝƐ<ƵŚŶ ?ƐThe 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions (henceforth called Structure). Gutting (1980) wrote that 
Structure has had  “a wider academic influence than any other single book of the last twenty 
ǇĞĂƌƐ ? ?Ɖ ?ǀ ? ?Twenty years later it was still the best-known academic book of the second half of 
the 20th century, translated into 20 languages and sold over a million copies (Fuller, 2000). On its 
50th anniversary edition in 2012, it became one of the most cited books ever with over 80,000 
citations and was reported by Scientific American ĂƐ “one of the most influential 20th-century 
works of philosophy and history of science ?(Stix, 2012). dŚĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨƚŚĞ “ƉĂƌĂĚŝŐŵƐŚŝĨƚ ?
that it popularized is the staple of boardroom discussions among top executives and the source 
of continuing debates among academics. Why does Structure bring about such a significant 
impact on the minds of scientists and academic discourse, and what implications does it have 
for the IS field? 
In light of the struggle in the IS field to find its identity, legitimacy, and relevance, Structure and 
the paradigm concept have critical roles to play. As the editor to the Atlantic once commented 
(Fallows, 1993, cited in Fuller 2000): 
Its basic point is that people typically go for years and years believing one thing 
 ?ĚĞƐƉŝƚĞŵŽƵŶƚŝŶŐĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞƚŽƚŚĞĐŽŶƚƌĂƌǇ ?dŚĞŶĂůůŽĨĂƐƵĚĚĞŶ, they notice 
the conflicting evidence, change their minds and wonder why they ever believed 
otherwise. 
Such is the case with the IS field. There may be certain beliefs and practices in the IS field that 
have become endemic and require major paradigm shifts in the minds and practices of its 
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research. Such a shift is not likely to happen if the field misunderstands what paradigm shifts 
entail. If paradigm shifts in research implies shifting from say positivism to some other non-
positivist epistemology, then a paradigm shift is accomplished by merely introducing alternative 
research methods. As this study argues, paradigm shifts that result in extraordinary progress 
imply much more than epistemological viewpoints. The received view of the paradigm concept 
ŝŶ/^ŶĞĞĚƐƚŽďĞƌĞǀŝƐŝƚĞĚ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞƉĂƌĂĚŝŐŵƐ ?ŽƚŚĞƌŵŽƌĞƉŽƚĞŶƚĐŽŵƉŽŶĞŶƚƐƌĞŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐĞĚ ?ŝŶ
order for a transformative understanding to be realized. 
At this stage, we should say what Kuhn himself said about the nature of a paradigm, although as 
we shall see, his view was both multi-faceted and also developmental. For Kuhn, paradigms are 
strongly related to what he called  “ŶŽƌŵĂůƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ? ?ĂƐŽƉƉŽƐĞĚƚŽ “ƌĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶĂƌǇƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ? ? ?dŚĞ
normal, everyday work of scientists within a particular field goes on within a given and taken-
for-granted background of assumptions about the field based on historical practice: 
ǇĐŚŽŽƐŝŶŐ ? ‘ƉĂƌĂĚŝŐŵƐ ? ?/ŵĞĂŶƚŽƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƚŚĂƚƐŽŵĞaccepted examples of 
actual scientific practice  W examples which include law, theory, application, and 
instrumentation together  W provide models from which spring particular 
coherent traditions of scientific research (Kuhn, 1962, p. 10) 
This very early (within Structure) description of a paradigm is developed in many ways later on  W 
Masterman (1970) found 22  W but Kuhn himself, in the Postscript to Structure, seven years later, 
claimed there were two primary ones: 
 ?ŝŶŵƵĐŚŽĨƚŚĞďŽŽŬ ?ƚŚĞƚĞƌŵ ‘ƉĂƌĂĚŝŐŵ ?ŝƐƵƐĞĚŝŶƚǁŽĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚƐĞŶƐĞƐ ?KŶ
the one hand, it stands for the entire constellation of beliefs, values, techniques, 
and so on shared by the members of a given community. On the other, it 
denotes one sort of element in that constellation, the concrete puzzle-solutions 
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which, employed as models or examples, can replace explicit rules as a basis for 
the solution of the remaining puzzles of normal science. (Kuhn, 1970b, p. 175) 
We can see already that these ideas are much more related to practical examples and practices 
than to metaphysical questions of epistemology or ontology. 
dŚĞDŝƐĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ<ƵŚŶ ?ƐWĂƌĂĚŝŐŵ 
When Structure was first published, it caused an uproar within the scientific community, who 
alleged that his theories tarnished the nobility of the sciences. In response to his critics Kuhn 
(1970b) added a 1969 postscript to the second edition to stress the primacy of the scientific 
community and its sociological role in the progress of sciences as well as to elaborate on the 
notion of the paradigm. Several years before, Kuhn defended Structure at a colloquium chaired 
by Karl Popper along with luminaries such as Stephen Toulmin, Imre Lakatos and Paul 
Feyerabend (Lakatos & Musgrave., 1970). In that colloquium, Popper (1970) suggested that 
Kuhn was a relativist, that his ideas dismiss the possibility of objective truth thereby prohibiting 
any challenges made to his claims. Lakatos (1970) objected to what he considered to be the 
irrational and dogmatic nature of the paradigm shift (citing the analogy of the shift to a religious 
conversion) and proposed supporting new theories that produce new facts that demonstrate 
the research has shown progress. Feyerabend (1970) was concerned about the prescriptive 
ŝŵƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨ<ƵŚŶ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌǇŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐƚŚĞĂůůĞŐĞĚƌĞƐƚƌŝĐƚŝǀĞŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨƚŚĞ<ƵŚŶŝĂŶƐĐŝĞŶƚŝĨŝĐ
enterprise that limits many theories to one, and to artificially create a normal science that has 
that single theory as its paradigm. We will show how a simplistic rendition of these sophisticated 
arguments taking the form of rigid-narrow (Kuhn) versus flexible-diverse (Feyerabend) thinking 
of research found its way into the organization sciences and the IS field.  
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A few years after the publications of <ƵŚŶ ?Ɛparadigms, several sociologists began emphasizing 
the epistemological sense of the paradigm by describing their field as following either positivist 
or phenomenological paradigms (Walsh, 1972), while others demarcated three paradigms W
nomological, interpretive and critical (Sherman, 1974). Despite protests (Eckberg & Hill Jr., 1979) 
saying that these sociologists misunderstood or perhaps even refused to accept the central 
meaning of the Kuhnian paradigm, specific research epistemologies were called paradigms as 
ƐƚƵĚŝĞƐŽŶƉĂƌĂĚŝŐŵƐƉƌŽůŝĨĞƌĂƚĞĚƚŚĞƐŽĐŝĂůƐĐŝĞŶĐĞƐ ?/ƚƐĞĞŵƐƚŚĂƚ ? “ŝĨ Kuhn has been 
concerned to delimit the meaning of his key terms, others have been engaged in extending 
ƚŚĞŵ ? (Perry, 1977). 
IS researchers will be familiar with the terms used by these sociologists to describe paradigms 
because they refer to epistemological worldviews that the field had grappled with in its own 
history (Lee, 1991b; Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991). As Hirschheim and Klein (1989, p. 1201) note, 
citing Burrell & Morgan (1979) ?ƚŚŝƐŵĞĂŶŝŶŐŽĨƉĂƌĂĚŝŐŵƐĂƐ “ŵĞƚĂ-theoretical assumptions 
ĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨƐĐŝĞŶĐĞĂŶĚƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ?ŝƐĂŵƵĐŚďƌŽĂĚĞƌŵĞĂŶŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ<ƵŚŶ(1970b, p. vii) 
ŝŶƚĞŶĚĞĚďǇ “ƵŶŝǀĞƌƐĂůůǇƌĞĐŽŐŶŝǌĞĚƐĐŝĞŶƚŝĨŝĐĂĐŚŝĞǀĞŵĞŶƚƐƚŚĂƚĨŽƌĂƚŝŵĞƉƌŽǀŝĚĞŵŽĚĞů
ƉƌŽďůĞŵƐĂŶĚƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶƐƚŽĂĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇŽĨƉƌĂĐƚŝƚŝŽŶĞƌƐ ? ?In contrast to this misappropriation of 
paradigms, studies outside of IS and the organizational science continued to hold views that 
were faithful to <ƵŚŶ ?ƐĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶ. For example, in the philosophy of science, Gutting (1980) 
ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞƐƉĂƌĂĚŝŐŵƐĂƐďĞŝŶŐ “universally recŽŐŶŝǌĞĚƐĐŝĞŶƚŝĨŝĐĂĐŚŝĞǀĞŵĞŶƚƐ ? while Bloor 
(1976, p. 57) ĚĞĨŝŶĞƐĂƉĂƌĂĚŝŐŵĂƐ “an exemplary piece of scientific work which creates a 
research tradition within some specialiǌĞĚĂƌĞĂŽĨƐĐŝĞŶƚŝĨŝĐĂĐƚŝǀŝƚǇ ? ? 
By holding to an epistemological view of the paradigm, (1) the organizational sciences limit 
themselves to the few epistemological and methodological approaches underlying research, and 
(2) choosing an epistemology results in these  “paradigms ? (which are actually epistemologies) 
 8 
into becoming incommensurable (Hassard, 1988; Jackson & Carter, 1991;1993; Willmott, 1993). 
This was very much the case with one of the original works within organizational science that 
proposed a ĨƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬŽĨ “paradigmƐ ?  W Burrell and Morgan's (1979) Sociological Paradigms 
and Organisational Analysis. This book was written at a time when functionalism/positivism in 
the organizational sciences was dominant and other research philosophies were seen as invalid. 
Burrell and Morgan wanted to create a legitimate space for alternative philosophies and so 
argued that these philosophies were distinct paradigms, based on fundamental underlying 
philosophical assumptions  W objectivism/subjectivism and regulation/change. This led to them 
ĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŶŐĨŽƵƌ “ƉĂƌĂĚŝŐŵƐ ?: (1) functionalist, (2) interpretivist, (3) radical structuralism, and 
(4) radical humanism, and to argue that they were incommensurable as they were based on 
contradictory assumptions. 
Notwithstanding the admission by Burrell and Morgan (1979, p. 35-36) that they did not use 
Kuhn's conception of paradigms as the basis of their work (see also Jackson and Carter's (1991) 
defense of Burrell and Morgan), the implications are the same: the Kuhnian paradigm concept is 
appropriated in ways resulting in undue preeminence given to epistemology. 
Incommensurability then becomes absolute because divergent philosophies are by definition, 
incommensurable. Instead of enriching the possibilities for research with the help of paradigms, 
research is guided by choosing from a handful of epistemological choices, which in turn 
spawned the argument for a need for pluralism in research. Banville and Landry (1989), 
reinforcing Kuhn ?s critics (Chalmers, 1998; Popper, 1970; Toulmin, 1972; Whitley, 1984), argue 
that IS researchers should reject the Kuhnian model and abandon the paradigm concept,  “as it 
rests upon assumptions of the Kuhnian model of science which imparts value to knowledge on 
the basis of the conformity of its methods and results to an explicit standard: physics ? (p. 50). 
Surely, a pluralistic field like MIS is not amenable to such a rigid notion of progress and it would 
 9 
cause a  “break-up of the field into rather hermetic factions and the consequent loss of the 
creativity generated by exchanges about research topics and research methods ? (p. 51)1. As a 
result, the IS field treated the paradigm concept as somewhat like an anathema. In the preface 
to Ein-Dor and Segev ?s (1981, p. vii) A Paradigm for Management Information Systems, the 
authors write: 
It is with some trepidation that we adopted the use of the word  “paradigm ? to 
describe our work. ... Our trepidations increased when one of our colleagues let 
it be known that he  “wouldn ?t be caught dead using the word ? ?a reflection of 
the recent disrepute into which this word has fallen. 
Other studies in IS collectively reinforce similar interpretations that have since become the 
received view2. In contradiction to healthy pluralism, many scholars in IS agree that the 
 “establishment of an MIS paradigm could actually restrict, rather than enhance, the progress of 
MIS as a scientific discipline ? (Cushing, 1990, p. 48). These claims ĞĐŚŽ&ĞǇĞƌĂďĞŶĚ ?Ɛ(1970) 
criticism of Kuhn saying that the Kuhnian model is monistic, ĂŵŽŶŽůŝƚŚŝĐŝĚĞŽůŽŐǇƚŚĂƚ “ƌĞƐƚƌŝĐƚ
ĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵ ?ƌĞĚƵĐĞƚŚĞŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨĐŽŵƉƌĞŚĞŶƐŝǀĞƚŚĞŽƌŝĞƐƚŽŽŶĞ ? ?ĂŶĚ ?ŚĂƐŽŶĞƚŚĞŽƌǇĂƐŝƚƐ
ƉĂƌĂĚŝŐŵ ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? ? ?ŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶƚůǇ ?ƚŚĞǀŝĞǁƚŚĂƚ<ƵŚŶŝĂŶŵŽĚĞůŝƐ too restrictive, and hands 
over IS to the  “rigor ? and  “objectivity ? of a hard science like physics are repeatedly emphasized 
by many IS authors (Avison, 1997; Hirschheim, et al., 1996; Jones, 1997; Khazanchi & Munkvold, 
2000; Klein, et al., 1991; Mingers, 2001).  
 
                                                          
1 This allusion to research methods and epistemology would later develop a life of its own in the form of 
an overemphasis on methods. 
2 As the following passage argues, this received view may have been inspired by FeyerabĞŶĚ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? ?
criticism of Kuhn. 
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Table 1: Use of the paradigm term in IS Research 
Articles IS references to paradigms 
Alavi and Carlson 
(1992) 
"the dominant positivist MIS research paradigm" (p. 57) 
Robey (1996) "Even the frequently-lamented domination of the positivist paradigm seems 
ƚŽŚĂǀĞǁĞĂŬĞŶĞĚ ? ?d ?ŚƵƐ ?ŝŶƚŚĞŝƌĞĂƌůŝĞƌĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚŽĨĂƌƚŝĐůĞƐŝŶ
mainstream IS journals, Orlikowski and Baroudi (1991) concluded that IS was 
dominated by positivist research and that interpretive studies and critical 
theory were underrepresented." (p. 402) 
Mingers (2001) "Rather than advocating a single paradigm, be it interpretive or positivist" 
 ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?KƌůŝŬŽǁƐŬŝĂŶĚĂƌŽƵĚŝ ? ? ? ? ? ?ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚƚŚƌĞĞďƌŽĂĚƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ
paradigms ? positivist, interpretivist, and criticaů ? ? “ŝƚŝƐĐŽŵŵŽŶůǇŚĞůĚ
ƚŚĂƚƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚŵĞƚŚŽĚƐĂƌĞďŽƵŶĚƚŽƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌƉĂƌĂĚŝŐŵƐ ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? ? 
Mingers (2003) "Underlying paradigm: in general, research methods develop within a 
ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌƉĂƌĂĚŝŐŵ ?ƚŚĞƌĞŚĂƐďĞĞŶĂƚĞŶĚĞŶĐǇƚŽůŝŶŬƋƵĂŶƚŝƚĂƚŝǀĞ
methods with a natural science (positivist) approach, and qualitative 
ŵĞƚŚŽĚƐǁŝƚŚĂƐŽĐŝĂůƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ?ŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚŝǀĞ ?ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ?Ɖ ? ?  ? ? ?ŽŶůǇ ? ?A?ŽĨ
ŝŶƐƚĂŶĐĞƐƵƐĞĚ ‘ŶŽŶƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶĂů ?ŵĞƚŚŽĚƐ ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? ?
Chen and 
Hirschheim (2004) 
"In summary, we suggest that the field has been dominated by the positivist 
paradigm, despite calls to the contrary" (p. 197) 




methodological movement (paradigm), with quantitative and qualitative 
methods representing the first and second movements (paradigms)" (p. 22) 
 
The connection between the claim that the Kuhnian paradigm is restrictive and the need for 
pluralism is supported by studies lamenting the lack of pluralism in IS research (Chen & 
Hirschheim, 2004; Mingers, 2001; Mingers, 2003; Nissen, et al., 1991). If a paradigm is the 
epistemology, then surely selecting a single epistemology entails a lack of pluralism. It is this 
conflation between the paradigm and epistemology that has caused IS researchers to consider 
the paradigm concept a threat to pluralism. Empirical evidence that the IS field has given 
preeminence to the epistemological sense of the paradigm can be seen in the language 
 11 
discussing paradigms by its senior scholars (Table 1). This preeminence of epistemology has led 
to a number of problems within IS research. 
Paradigm wars in research 
Incommensurability ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ “ƉĂƌĂĚŝŐŵƐ ? becomes absolute because divergent philosophies 
are by definition, incommensurable. Instead of enriching the possibilities for research with the 
help of paradigms, research is guided by choosing from a handful of epistemological choices,  
Even  “miǆĞĚŵĞƚŚŽĚƐ ? research ŝƐƐĞĞŶĂƐĂŬŝŶĚŽĨƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŚĂƚ “ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ ?ĞǆŝƐƚŝŶŐ ?
ƉĂƌĂĚŝŐŵƐ ?ŵĞĂŶŝŶŐĞƉŝƐƚĞŵŽůŽŐŝĞƐ ?ĂƌĞƌŽƵƚŝŶĞůǇĐŽŵďŝŶĞĚ ?(Mingers, 2001, p. 240). As a 
result, calls for pluralism are usually accompanied by recommendations to apply alternative 
epistemologies such as interpretive, critical, postmodern or other anti-positivist approaches. 
dŚŝƐĞƉŝƐƚĞŵŽůŽŐŝĐĂůĂŶĚŵĞƚŚŽĚŽůŽŐŝĐĂůƚƵƐƐůĞĂƐƐƵŵĞĚ “ƉĂƌĂĚŝŐŵŝŶĐŽŵŵĞŶƐƵƌĂďŝůŝƚǇ ?ĂŶĚŝƚƐ
logical conclusion ?ƚŚĞ “ƉĂƌĂĚŝŐŵǁĂƌ ?(Mingers, 2004). 
Part of the confusion over the distinction between different philosophical research methods 
stems from the emphasis placed on epistemological choices themselves as a means of 
classifying, designing, and evaluating research such that the philosophy and the method become 
surrogates for the content of the research. Epistemology is the branch of philosophy concerned 
with the theory of knowledge and how we acquire knowledge while ontology, a branch of 
metaphysics, concerns the nature of the world around us.  “WŽƐŝƚŝǀŝƐŵ ?ŝƐ ? PĂŶĞƉŝƐƚĞŵŽůŽŐǇ
which posits beliefs (emerging from the search for regularity and causal relationships) and 
ƐĐƌƵƚŝŶŝǌĞƐƚŚĞŵƚŚƌŽƵŐŚĞŵƉŝƌŝĐĂůƚĞƐƚŝŶŐ ? (Hirschheim, 1985, p. 14). Certain epistemologies 
embrace specific ontological positions. Positivism embraces the ontological position of realism 
(Hirschheim, 1985) and is often associated with certain research methods, or procedures 
 “ĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚĞĚǁŝƚŚŝŶĨĞƌĞŶƚŝĂůƐƚĂƚŝƐƚŝĐƐ ?ŚǇƉŽƚŚĞƐŝƐƚĞƐƚŝŶŐ ?ŵĂƚŚĞŵĂƚŝĐĂůĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ?ĂŶĚ
experimental and quasi-ĞǆƉĞƌŝŵĞŶƚĂůĚĞƐŝŐŶ ?(Lee, 1991b, p. 342). 
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As Lee (1991b) notes, positivist and other non-positivist epistemologies are not irreconcilable, in 
fact,  “describing a paper as positivist tells us nothing about the type of method used (e.g. 
qualitative methods can be used for positivist research) or the type of explanation provided by 
the research ?(Hovorka & Lee, 2010, p. 2). In other words, an over-emphasis on the 
epistemology at least holds back and at worse harms the advance of research. Focusing on 
whether the research is positivist, interpretivist or whatever else is convenient for 
methodological purposes, but it comes fraught with problems. Scholars in the management and 
cross-cultural studies echo similar problems. Eckberg and Hill (1979) argue that the original 
function of the Kuhnian paradigm is to act as exemplars for scientists to see their way in 
research on a concrete level, not as abstract representations of beliefs, presuppositions or 
worldviews. Without a concrete exemplar, puzzle solving becomes problematic, let alone the 
task of building a revolution in thought and progressing research forward. 
Squeezing out innovative views 
Peering only through these philosophical lenses prevents researchers from exploring alternative 
options. Willmott (1993) argues that the philosophical choices, as represented by Burrell and 
Morgan (1979), constrains the process of theory development because it restricts research 
within polarized mutually exclusive ways of seeing. They engender within the IS field, rather 
arbitrarily, that research ŚĂƐƚŽďĞĐŽŶĚƵĐƚĞĚǁŝƚŚŝŶĚŝƐĐƌĞƚĞ “ŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞ ?Žƌ “ƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀĞ ? ?
 “ƌĞŐƵůĂƚĞĚ ?Žƌ “ƌĂĚŝĐĂů ?ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĞƐ ? Agreeing with Willmott (1993), Deetz (1996) highlights how 
these limited choices constrain sociological inquiry and demonstrates the limitation in the case 
of postmodernism, which Burrell and Morgan's (1979) framework ignores ? not to mention 
other forms of inquiry such as feminism, queer studies, post-structuralism, practice theories and 
many others. Studies in cross-cultural education and management that favors pluralism and 
paradigm-crossing severely criticize Burrell and Morgan's (1979) epistemological rendering of 
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ƉĂƌĂĚŝŐŵƐƚŚĂƚĐƌĞĂƚĞƐ “a structure of simplistic and ambiguous dimensionality where complex 
and diverse notions are forced into artificial and ill-fitting unity ? (Greenfield & Ribbins, 1993, p. 
178). By launching the paradigm concept "into organization theory in the most un-Kuhnian 
manner  ?[it contradicts the very] transformational dynamic of paradigms put forward by Kuhn ? 
(Lowe, et al., 2007, p. 238). 
An instance of this squeezing out of other epistemological approaches is demonstrated in the IS 
field with the case of critical research. For many years, the IFIP community promoted the critical 
IS research agenda (Kaplan, et al., 2004; Lyytinen & Klein, 1985). Nevertheless, critical research 
is generally ignored (Chen & Hirschheim, 2004) ?ƐƵĐŚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞĞǆŝƐƚƐ “a widespread view that 
IS researchers face a methodological choice between positivism and interpretivism as the two 
fundamental ways of researching and understanding the world ? (Richardson & Robinson, 2007, 
p. 252). The problem is, even if critical approaches in research takes over from positivist or 
interpretive research, it will likely squeeze out those latter approaches too. Research therefore 
becomes less about the core concern of the study, and more of whether it is say, positivist or 
interpretive, quantitative or qualitative. Unconsciously, these epistemological considerations 
trump the goals of the research themselves resulƚŝŶŐŝŶĂ “boxed-in" (Alvesson & Sandberg, 
2014) approach to research. 
Impoverishment from Reductionism 
The scripted manner of choosing the epistemological approach (e.g., positivist or interpretive) 
risks impoverishing research in IS. The danger comes from lumping together numerous rich and 
insightful views into a handful of epistemological perspectives. The preoccupation with 
epistemology leads to a form of reductionism that impoverishes both the paradigm as well as 
the epistemological or ontological view. For example, the positive philosophy of Comte (1830-
42) is very different from functionalism of Durkheim (1951/1897), which is in turn different from 
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that of Parsons (1949). Although their works are all labeled "positivist," they differ in goals and 
core concerns, and more importantly, elements of these positivist philosophies can be found in 
anti-positivist, post-positivist and qualitative approaches.  
For instance, concerns for reasonableness and empirical evidence are found in both positivistic 
thought (Von Mises, 1956) and in interpretivist (Dilthey, 1883/1989) approaches. Malinowski 
and Radcliffe-Brown are criticized for their functionalism and positivism (Jarvie, 1969; O'Reilly, 
2009) even though they are considered founders and scholars of ethnography and cultural 
anthropology, terms associated with qualitative research and interpretivism. The differences 
between Radcliffe-ƌŽǁŶ ?Ɛ(1940) approach to anthropology and that of Malinowski (1922) are 
lost when they are lumped together as positivists. The depth of any analysis is lost when all 
those rich perspectives are lumped into "paradigms" generically called positivism or 
interpretivism. That is why Hirschheim and Klein (1989) deliberated on this loss in depth of 
ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐďǇĞǆƚĞŶĚŝŶŐƵƌƌĞůůĂŶĚDŽƌŐĂŶ ?ƐĨŽƵƌƉĂƌĂĚŝŐŵƐĨŽƌ/^ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ? 
Obscuring Key Research Concerns 
The conflation of paradigm with epistemology obscures the core concerns of the research. 
Vaguely defined epistemologies such as posivitism, interpretivism, and critical research do little 
towards enhancing the core concerns of the research itself. Productive research seldom begins 
with the epistemological consideration of whether the research should be positivist or 
interpretivist. The likes of Emile Durkheim, Max Weber, Karl Marx and Malinowski did not begin 
their research with these epistemological questions; instead, they worked on explaining the core 
concerns of their research: the occurrence of suicide, growth of capitalism, class conflict or 
universal culture, and as a result, applied a wide variety of theoretical strategies, some of them 
positivist, many of them interpretivist, and sometimes both at the same time. As Czarniawska 
(2013) notes, vaguely defined concepts, such as these epistemologies, obscure the empirical 
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realities that these scholars study rather than illuminate them. In other words, there are no 
direct relationships between epistemology and research methods. Methods should be chosen 
not because of the assumed epistemology underlying the research, but because of the fit 
between the metaphysics of the object of study and methodological requirements. 
One example of how research concerns in IS can be obscured is the case of design science 
research (DSR). Walls et al. (2004, pp. 55-56), in evaluating how design theories are being 
ĂƉƉůŝĞĚ ?ĨŝŶĚƚŚĂƚŵŽƐƚƐƚƵĚŝĞƐƵƐĞĚĞƐŝŐŶƚŚĞŽƌŝĞƐ “ĂƐĂ ĐůŽĂŬŽĨƚŚĞŽƌĞƚŝĐĂůůĞŐŝƚŝŵĂĐǇ ?Žƌ “ĂƐĂ
common language and framework, at a superficial level, rather than in advancing theory, ? while 
Gregor and Hevner (2013, p. 338) ƐĞĞƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĞƌƐĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐŝŶŐ “ongoing confusion and 
ŵŝƐƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐƐŽĨ^Z ?ƐĐĞntral ideas ? ?dŚĞƌĞĂƐŽŶĨŽƌƚŚĞƉƌŽďůĞŵƐĚĞƐŝŐŶƐĐŝĞŶĐĞŝƐĨĂĐŝŶŐ
may be traced to a conflict within its epistemology. The DSR paradigm was constructed based on 
finding a bridge to the paradigm of the behavioral sciences (Hevner, et al., 2004; March & Smith, 
1995; Simon, 1981; Walls, et al., 1992) essentially  “ďǇĞŶŐĂŐŝŶŐƚŚĞĐŽŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĂƌǇƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ
ĐǇĐůĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶĚĞƐŝŐŶƐĐŝĞŶĐĞĂŶĚďĞŚĂǀŝŽƌĂůƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ? (Hevner, et al., 2004, p. 76-77), whereas 
the stated goals of DSR is to produce artifacts in the form of constructs, models, methods and 
instantiations (Hevner, et al., 2004; March & Smith, 1995). We argue, because of this conflict 
between the epistemology of design science and its goals which are artefactual, the desired 
progress of DSR is held back. KŶĞŽĨ/ŝǀĂƌŝ ?Ɛ(2007) theses about the philosophy underlying DSR 
ĂůůƵĚĞƐƚŽƚŚŝƐĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚ P “ĞƐŝŐŶƉƌŽĚƵĐƚĂŶĚĚĞƐŝŐŶƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ ?ĂƐprescriptive 
knowledge, forms a knowledge area of its own and cannot be reduced to the descriptive 
ŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞŽĨƚŚĞŽƌŝĞƐĂŶĚĞŵƉŝƌŝĐĂůƌĞŐƵůĂƌŝƚŝĞƐ ? ?Ɖ ? ? ?  ?/ŶƐƚĞĂĚŽĨĂƚƚĞŵƉƚŝŶŐƚŽĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚ
tortuous links within metaphysical paradigms, we argue that DSR stands to benefit more from 
exemplars in design theories (McPhee, 1996) and design-related fields such as architecture (Lee, 
1991a;2010). 
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A Misplaced Focus on Methodology 
The reliance on the epistemological sense of the paradigm diverts the attention of the 
researcher from the "context of discovery" and limits the research to the "context of 
justification." The appeal of the scripted research model that links epistemology to methods lies 
in its intuitiveness and simplicity; yet, it masks two faulty assumptions. First, within the context 
of justification, there is an implicit assumption about a direct relationship between philosophical 
approaches (e.g. positivism) and methods (e.g. field studies and questionnaires)(Mingers, 2001). 
This faulty assumption raises questions among researchers concerning methods. For example, 
why is it that case studies, which have traditionally been a qualitative method can be a positivist 
method? How can field studies, which are traditionally part of the positivist research methods, 
be suitable for interpretive studies (Klein & Myers, 1999)? What follows from the ensuing 
confusion are somewhat less than rigorous results from attempting to be both quantitative and 
qualitative (Dubé & Paré, 2003; Lee, 1991b). Second, this scripted model does not require 
extensive study of the nature of object beings researched. Generally, positivist researchers 
adopt the indicator-latent variable approach and focus on identifying good indicators that feed 
into measurement and statistical models to derive conclusions (Goertz & Mahoney, 2012). The 
tendency then is to focus on operationalizing and analyzing datasets rather than on analyzing 
models, constructs, and concepts. Thus, when a PhD student is faced with a "positivist" study, 
there is an immediate connection to some specified set of methods that supposedly will reveal 
the answers to the research questions; or when faced with "qualitative" research, other 
methods apply. Roszak (1972, p. 202) succinctly describes this over-emphasis on method:  
 “The methodologies of a Max Weber or a Freud yield brilliant insights only in 
the hands of a Weber or a Freud; in the hands of lesser talents, they yield what 
may be less worth having than the blunders of a great mind. One might almost 
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suspect that methodology is the preoccupation of mediocrity, the dullard's great 
hope of equaling the achievements of the gifted ? ?
Therefore, methodology becomes the façade for legitimacy and the crutch for validity, as if the 
statistics applied unquestionably made the results valid; or the coding method correctly 
categorized subjective norms. Ciborra (1998) says it best when contemplating the "crisis" in the 
IS field: "Hence, concern with method is probably one of the key features of our discipline, and 
possibly the true origin of its crisis" (original emphasis). What is lost in blindly following the 
epistemologically-guided method is the sense of discovery that can only come from a close 
examination of the object of study, a detailed inspection of the technology being applied, and 
the exciting creative thinking from which novel theories are spawned. 
Struggling with Cumulative Tradition 
The mistaken assumption that epistemologies are paradigms to researchers leaves these 
researchers in a situation where no paradigms can ever be challenged, since time and resource 
pressures maintain researchers in their different epistemological camps throughout their 
research careers. But as Kuhn (1970b) explains, the transition from normal science to 
extraordinary science takes place when anomalies and achievements in research causes 
paradigms to be abandoned by the community for other paradigms. Unfortunately, researchers 
who regularly apply and have invested their careers on, say, positivist approaches, cannot be 
expected to abandon their positivist methods. The same goes for interpretivist researchers. This 
creates a situation where novelty and progress in the form of paradigm shifts become unlikely. 
On the other hand, since paradigms are not merely epistemologies, a positivist or interpretivist 
researcher can be inspired by any paradigm or work on any novel theory that causes a new 
paradigm to emerge, without necessarily abandoning their positivist or interpretivist 
preferences. What leads to novel research is not choosing between philosophical approaches; it 
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is the subsequent acquisition of new paradigms and subsequent dethronement of less 
productive ones. Research that allows the epistemological rendering of the paradigm to 
dominate is unlikely to witness any revolutions in their research, and therefore will see little 
progress or cumulative tradition. 
The transition from normal science to extraordinary science and the accumulation of knowledge 
often involves challenging the status quo. Merton (1968, p. 30) describes this phenomenon as 
finding a balance between erudition, that is being faithful to the status quo and demonstrating 
proper scholarly depth, and originality, that is, ǀĞŶƚƵƌŝŶŐďĞǇŽŶĚ ?ĂŶĚĞǀĞŶ “ĨŽƌŐĞƚƚŝŶŐ ?ƚŚĞ
status quo in order to engender creativity in research. The extent to which IS researchers draw 
or escape from those same tired approaches determines the contemporaneity and 
cumulativeness of their research. Fields of studies like IS that have a proportionally larger 
frontier tend to be inspired by classic studies of reference disciplines more than 
contemporaneous studies resulting in IS researchers tending not to build upon the works of 
their colleagues  ? “ĞĂƚŝŶŐŽƵƌŽǁŶĚŽŐĨŽŽĚ ? (Davenport & Markus, 1999, p. 22)). 
Thus, the less IS researchers recycle paradigms from reference disciplines, and the more they 
build upon the immediate works of their colleagues, the more likely they will build cumulative 
tradition. It is important to be familiar with the classic paradigms because rereading them 
enriches the research. But rereading can take the form of excessive borrowing and unhealthy 
reverence for the original authors and their paradigms. In other words, originality requires a 
certain level of willingness to question the original thought and even forget previous research. 
As Whitehead (1917, p. 115) observes: "A science which hesitates to forget its founders is lost." 
DĂƐƚĞƌŵĂŶ ?Ɛ/ŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶ of the Paradigm Concept 
 19 
These misinterpretations of the Kuhnian paradigm warrant a re-examination of how paradigms 
are adopted and appropriated in the IS field because they have direct implications on existing 
and future research directions. As Kuhn had repeatedly emphasized in Structure and later 
writings, the difficulty of pinning down the exact meaning of the paradigm term should not 
diminish its usefulness as it is applied in different fields. The complex milieu of thinking 
surrounding the development of and reception to Structure was later published in a collection 
titled The Essential Tension, where Kuhn (1977) acknowledged the many interpretations and 
possible confusion and difficulties his writings might have produced. The received view of the 
monistic nature of the Kuhnian paradigm in the IS field is inconsistent with other well-known 
criticisms of Kuhn. Popper (1970), one of Kuhn ?s most vocal opponents, considers Kuhn a 
 “relativist ? (despite <ƵŚŶ ?Ɛ protests) for saying that different frameworks and world-views can 
never be compared unless  “we have agreed on fundamentals ? (p. 56). This critique developed 
into the thesis of  “incommensurability ? (Shapere, 1971, p. 708)  which was appropriated in 
divergent ways by different research communities. Relativism implies that many points of view 
are equally valid, suggesting that while Kuhn ?s critics consider his model pluralistic, the received 
view in IS considers it monistic. The received view in IS also sees the Kuhnian model as physics-
inspired, deterministic and epistemologically rational (Banville & Landry, 1989; Whitley, 1984), 
devoid of sociological perspectives that are so crucial to a correct understanding of the progress 
of science. While his critics (Keat & Urry, 2010; Urry, 1973) acknowledge <ƵŚŶ ?Ɛ sociological 
contributions and the sociologically irreducible nature of his model, Kuhn ?Ɛ sociological 
perspective implies that even the most rigorous scientist is merely part of a community that is 
equally open to ideological strife and controversy. In fact, among the earliest to take advantage 
of the Kuhnian paradigm were the social sciences, which had struggled for decades under the 
hegemony of the positivist  “hard sciences ? (Fuller, 2000). 
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Ironically, Kuhn himself had anticipated what became the received view of the paradigm in IS. 
With regard to the allegation that the paradigm concept engenders a monistic unified model, 
Kuhn (1970b) wrote: 
What has been said so far may have seemed to imply that normal science is a 
single monolithic and unified enterprise that must stand or fall with any one of 
its paradigms as well as with all of them together.  But science is obviously 
seldom or never like that (p. 49).  
And on the allegation that the Kuhnian paradigm forces the model of physics and the natural 
sciences on the social sciences, Kuhn (1970b, p. 160) anticipated how this model of progress 
could be misconstrued to favor certain disciplines like physics: 
Nowhere does this show more clearly than in the recurrent debates about 
whether one or another of the contemporary social sciences is really a science. 
 ?DĞŶĂƌŐƵĞƚŚĂƚƉƐǇĐŚŽůŽŐǇ ?ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ŝƐĂƐĐience because it possesses 
such and such characteristics. Others counter that those characteristics are 
either unnecessary or not sufficient to make a field a science. Often great 
energy is invested, great passion aroused, and the outsider is at a loss to know 
why. Can very much depend upon a definition of  ‘science ? Can a definition tell a 
ŵĂŶǁŚĞƚŚĞƌŚĞŝƐĂƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚŽƌŶŽƚ ? ?WƌŽďĂďůǇƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐůŝŬĞƚŚĞĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐĂƌĞ
really being asked: Why does my field fail to move ahead in the way that, say, 
physics does? What changes in technique or method or ideology would enable it 
to do so? These are not, however, questions that could respond to an 
agreement on definition (Original emphasis). 
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As this passage explains, it was not Kuhn ?s intent to impose a physics model on his own model 
nor will any definition of science be able to rescue any field concerned about its disciplinary 
problems. What does matter is whether or not the field has made progress, regardless of 
whether it is physics, psychology, the arts or philosophy. In fact, it was the social sciences that 
took advantage of the Kuhnian paradigm concept by quickly declaring respectability under the 
protection of their own unique paradigms (Fuller, 2000). As these evidences show, the simplistic 
received view of rigid-narrow-Kuhnian paradigm versus let-the-many-flowers-bloom dichotomy 
of IS research is at best mistaken. 
Yet another, subtler, view of the paradigm in the IS field is the notion that a paradigm is 
something that is beyond the reach of any individual or group of researchers, that it is, in some 
ĞǆĐŚĂŶŐĞƐĂŵŽŶŐ/^ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĞƌƐ ? “ŝŵƉŽƐƐŝďůĞĨŽƌĂƌĞƐĂƌĐŚĞƌƚŽƐƚĞƉŽƵƚƐŝĚĞŚŝƐ ?ŚĞƌƉĂƌĂĚŝŐŵ
ŽƌŝŶǀĞŶƚĂŶĞǁƉĂƌĂĚŝŐŵ ? ?^ƵĐŚĂǀŝĞǁŵŝƌƌŽƌƐWŽƉƉĞƌ ?Ɛ(1970) criticism of Kuhn surrounding 
incommensurability. Kuhn (1970a) acknowledges the  “special difficulties about stepping into 
ƐŽŵĞŽŶĞĞůƐĞ ?ƐĨƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬ ?(p. 232) but also stresses ƚŚĂƚ “ƚƌĂŶƐůĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? ?ŝƐĂůǁĂǇƐ
possible. Also, Kuhn (1970b) discusses extensively about the invention of theories, and of 
discoveries and how those inventions ǁĞƌĞ “responsible for such paradigm shifts as the 
Copernican, Newtonian, chemical, and Einsteinian revolutions ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? ? 
We are not saying that paradigms are routinely shattered or invented by individuals or groups of 
researchers, nor are we disputing the underlying social processes that need to transpire for a 
paradigm to be accepted by the community. Cases like those of Copernicus, Newton, Thomas 
Young, Lavoisier, Einstein (Kuhn, 1970b), Mendel (Brannigan, 1979), Adam Smith, Ricardo, 
Keynes, Marx (Foucault, 1970) and others demonstrate, that individuals and groups of 
researchers can directly or indirectly cause the emergence of new paradigms. In the history of 
science, there is a certain pattern of discovery and of innovation that Kuhn has managed to 
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distill, and that pattern or paradigm, can indeed ďĞ “ƵƐĞĚ ?Žƌ “ĂƉƉůŝĞĚ ? ?&ŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ƐĞǀĞƌĂů
studies describe how the paradigm is used ĂƐ “ĂƉƵǌǌůĞ-ƐŽůǀŝŶŐĚĞǀŝĐĞ ? (Masterman, 1970, p. 
68), how  “ƐŽĐŝŽůŽŐŝƐƚƐĂŶĚƚŚĞŝƌuse ŽĨƚŚĞƉĂƌĂĚŝŐŵĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ ?(Eckberg & Hill Jr., 1979, p. 929 
emphasis added) transformed their field, and how ƚŚĞĚŝƐĐŝƉůŝŶĞŽĨĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƐ “ĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƐƚŽ
ĂƉƉůǇ<ƵŚŶ ?(Blaug, 1975, p. 408). Closer to the IS field, Ğůů ?Ɛ(1973) application of normal 
science in The Coming of the Post-Industrial Society (Fuller, 2000) ? the classic text that brought 
/dĂŶĚƚŚĞ “ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶĂŐĞ ?ƚŽƚŚĞĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƉƵďůŝĐ ? demonstrates how a new 
paradigm can be ƚƌŝŐŐĞƌĞĚďǇ “ĂŶĂǁĂƌĞŶĞƐƐŽĨĂŶĂŶŽŵĂůǇ ? that challenges widely held 
assumptions (Slife & Williams, 1995) in technological change. Our point is that new paradigms 
become possible through many different complex processes, including efforts made by 
researchers themselves, through the weight of evidence, to convert the whole community to 
their point of view. This process by which paradigms emerge, which is rarely studied in the IS 
field, is beyond the scope of this paper.  
We are at the point where we can now define the Kuhnian paradigm and introduce one 
particular interpretation of it that is relevant to the concerns of the IS field. We define the 
Kuhnian paradigm as a shared exemplar for scientific practice, which communities of scientists 
and researchers agree in part or completely, that provide models from which coherent 
scientific traditions may emerge. Masterman (1970) was among the earliest to acknowledge 
the usefulness of this paradigm concept, especially as a guide by which scientists are still able to 
perform their research in the period in which theories are absent (the pre-paradigm period). 
During this period, as Kuhn (1970b) describes it, most research communities within that pre-
paradigmatic field is  “ĨŽƌĐĞĚƚŽďƵŝůĚŚŝƐĨŝĞůĚĂŶĞǁĨƌŽŵŝƚƐĨŽƵŶĚĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? (pp. 13-15) giving the 
examples of the physical optics and the electromagnetism communities, which took a long time 
to agree on their paradigms. While some fields build their foundations, other pre-paradigmatic 
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fields, like the IS field, borrow their paradigms from other disciplines and draw their direction of 
research, with few modifications, from those paradigms. 
What transpires during this pre-paradigmatic period, as we can see in the IS field, is a situation 
where there is wide disagreement on fundamental issues and on the objects of study in the 
field, or at least in the objects that should be studied (Lee, 1999;2010). The IS community 
disagrees on which theoretical principles are most relevant (Gray, 2003), and disagrees on 
whether the field has made any progress (Grover, et al., 2006a; Grover, et al., 2006b; Wade, et 
al., 2006a;2006b). As many scholars argue (Alvesson & Sandberg, 2013a; Ravitch & Riggan, 2012; 
Rivard, 2014; Slife & Williams, 1995), progress in any field is made when underlying assumptions 
are uncovered and challenged, and much of these assumptions take the form of paradigms that 
have far-reaching consequences. There have been numerous interpretations of the Kuhnian 
model; however, bĂƐĞĚŽŶ<ƵŚŶ ?ƐŽǁŶĞŶĚŽƌƐĞŵĞŶƚ ?ǁĞĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌDĂƐƚĞƌŵĂŶ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶ
to be most useful for a multidisciplinary field like IS. In an interview, Kuhn fondly recalls the first 
ƚŝŵĞŚĞŚĞĂƌĚŽĨDĂƐƚĞƌŵĂŶ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƉĂƌĂĚŝŐŵĂƚƚŚĞ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŽůůŽƋƵŝƵŵŝŶ
ƚŚĞWŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇŽĨ^ĐŝĞŶĐĞ ? “ ?ŵǇ'ŽĚ ?ŝĨ/ŚĂĚƚĂůŬĞĚĨŽƌĂŶŚŽƵƌĂŶĚĂŚĂůĨ/ŵŝŐŚƚŚĂǀĞŐŽƚƚĞŶ
thesĞĂůůŝŶ ?DĂƐƚĞƌŵĂŶ ?Ɛ ? ?ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚŵĞĂŶŝŶŐƐŽĨƉĂƌĂĚŝŐŵƐ ? ?Žƌ/ŵŝŐŚƚŶŽƚŚĂǀĞ ?ƵƚƐŚĞ ?ƐŐŽƚ
ŝƚƌŝŐŚƚ ? ?(Baltas, et al., 2000, p. 300) ?ƌĞƚƵƌŶƚŽDĂƐƚĞƌŵĂŶ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ<ƵŚŶŝĂŶ
paradigm concept offers valuable insights to these questions and issues. 
Kuhn ?s critics, who selectively choose parts of evidence that only support their contention, often 
omit Masterman ?s (1970) positive evaluations of the paradigm concept that form the bulk of her 
commentary on Kuhn ?s work. Masterman (1970) elaborates favoƌĂďůǇŽŶƚŚĞ “originality of 
Kuhn ?ƐƐŽĐŝŽůŽŐŝĐĂůŶŽƚŝŽŶŽĨĂƉĂƌĂĚŝŐŵ ?ƉĂƌĂĚŝŐŵƐĂƐĂƉƵǌǌůĞ-solving devicĞ ?ƉĂƌĂĚŝŐŵĂƐĂ
way of seeing ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? ?ƐDĂƐƚĞƌŵĂŶ(1970) puts it,  “we are not going to be able to go back to 
where we were before Kuhn ? (p. 87). After listing twenty-one different senses in which the term 
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paradigm was used by Kuhn, she concludes that they can in fact be grouped into three main 
categories: (1) metaphysical paradigms or metaparadigms, (2) sociological paradigms, and (3) 
artefact or conceptual paradigms. These three ways of viewing the paradigm are summarized in 
Table 2. 
Table 2 PDĂƐƚĞƌŵĂŶ ?ƐĂƚĞŐŽƌŝĞƐŽĨ<ƵŚŶŝĂŶWĂƌĂĚŝŐŵƐ 
Paradigms Definition Examples of paradigms in Kuhn ?Ɛ
Structure  
Metaphysical Paradigms Beliefs, myths, speculations, ways 
of seeing, organizing principles, 
maps of reality 
Aristotelian dynamics, phlogistic 
chemistry, Descartes extreme 
ƐĐĞƉƚŝĐŝƐŵ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞ “ůŝŐŚƚŶŝŶŐĨůĂƐŚ ?
ƚŚĂƚ “ŝŶƵŶĚĂƚĞƐ ?ĂƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐůǇ 
obscure puzzle 
Sociological Paradigms Recognized achievements, 
political bases, grammatical 
usage, accepted judicial decision 
ĞŶũĂŵŝŶ&ƌĂŶŬůŝŶ ?Ɛ “ĐŽŶƐĞƌǀĂƚŝŽŶ
ŽĨĐŚĂƌŐĞƐ ?ĂĐŚŝĞǀĞŵĞŶƚƐŝŶ
corpuscular or wave optics, legal 
precedence 
Artefactual or Conceptual 
Paradigms 
Classical textbooks, standard 
illustrations and analogies, 
standard procedures, 
applications and techniques, 
standard tools 
WƚŽůĞŵǇ ?ƐAlmagest ĂŶĚEĞǁƚŽŶ ?Ɛ
Opticks, the standard procedures 
used prior to the discovery of 
oxygen, instrumentation and 
machine-factory tools 
 ?ŽŵƉĂƌĞ<ƵŚŶ ?ƐĞǆĂŵƉůĞƐŽĨƉĂƌĂĚŝŐŵƐǁŝƚŚŚŽǁƚŚĞ/^ĨŝĞůĚĂƉplies this term in Table 1, p. 10. 
Metaphysical Paradigm 
The metaphysical paradigm highlights the philosophical component of the paradigm concept 
that operates throughout the entire discipline. The metaphysical senses of paradigm include 
sets of beliefs, myths, speculations, standards, ways of seeing, organizing principles that govern 
perception, a map or something that determines reality, which was partly described in the title 
to Structure ?s 10th ĐŚĂƉƚĞƌĂƐ “ĐŚĂŶŐĞƐŽĨǁŽƌůĚǀŝĞǁ3. DĂƐƚĞƌŵĂŶŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚƐ<ƵŚŶ ?Ɛ(1970b) 
                                                          
3 Kuhn (1970b) did not use the term metaphysics in the pejorative sense and alluded to it again in his 
Postscript description of the disciplinary matrix:  “ŽŶƐŝĚĞƌ next a second type of component of the 
ĚŝƐĐŝƉůŝŶĂƌǇŵĂƚƌŝǆ ?ƐĂŝĚŝŶŵǇŽƌŝŐŝŶĂůƚĞǆƚƵŶĚĞƌƐƵĐŚƌƵďƌŝĐƐĂƐ “ŵĞƚĂƉŚǇƐŝĐĂůƉĂƌĂĚŝŐŵƐ ? or  “ƚŚĞ
metapŚǇƐŝĐĂůƉĂƌƚƐŽĨƚŚĞƉĂƌĂĚŝŐŵƐ ? ĂƐ “ďĞůŝĞĨƐŝŶƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌŵŽĚĞůƐ ? (p. 184).  
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ƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐƚŽ “ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĂůĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶĂŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚǀŝĞǁƐŽĨŶĂƚƵƌĞ ?
incommensurable ways of seeiŶŐƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚĂŶĚŽĨƉƌĂĐƚŝĐŝŶŐƐĐŝĞŶĐĞŝŶŝƚ ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? “ďŽĚǇŽĨ
ďĞůŝĞĨ ?ĞǆƚĞƌŶĂůůǇƐƵƉƉůŝĞĚ ?ƉĞƌŚĂƉƐďǇĂĐƵƌƌĞŶƚŵĞƚĂƉŚǇƐŝĐ ? ?ĐĂƵƐŝŶŐ ?ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚŵĞŶ
ĐŽŶĨƌŽŶƚŝŶŐƚŚĞƐĂŵĞƌĂŶŐĞŽĨƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶĂ ? ?ƚŽ ?ŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚƚŚĞŵŝŶĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚǁĂǇƐ ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? ?  “an 
essential part of a philosophical paradigm ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? ? ?ĂƐƚŚŝƐŵĞƚĂƉŚǇƐŝĐĂůƉĂƌĂĚŝŐŵ ? Specific 
historical examples of this usage given in Structure include: Aristotelian dynamics, phlogistic 
chemistry, beliefs about fundamental entities of the universe, Descartes extreme scepticism, 
ĂŶĚƚŚĞ “ůŝŐŚƚŶŝŶŐĨůĂƐŚ ? that comes to the scientists allowing them to see what was previously 
not seeing. Both Aristotelian dynamics and phlogistic chemistry assume certain metaphysics (or 
ontologies) regarding matter. The idea that cerƚĂŝŶƐƵďƐƚĂŶĐĞƐĂƌĞ “ŚĞĂǀŝĞƌ ? than others and the 
ŶŽƚŝŽŶŽĨĂ “ŶĂƚƵƌĂů ? downward motion are ontological doctrines presupposed in those 
paradigms, and these doctrines determine possible ways in which puzzles about nature can be 
investigated. Descartes ? skepticism is a paradigm that assumes an ontology of knowledge that is 
certain (scientia) or less so (persuasio), and an epistemology that certain knowledge can be 
achieved by removing doubt. Finally, the  “lightning flash ? that comes to the scientists is 
analogous to the  “gestalt switch, ? a different way of seeing that is necessary before a scientist 
can reorganize the reality of the research anew. 
ŶŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶŶĞĞĚƐƚŽďĞŵĂĚĞŚĞƌĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶǁŚĂƚ<ƵŚŶƌĞĨĞƌƐƚŽĂƐ “ǁĂǇƐŽĨ
ƐĞĞŝŶŐƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚ ? ?ƚŚĞŵĞƚĂphysics,  “and of practicing science in it, ? the epistemology. Like in 
the case of Descartes, a certain metaphysical and ontological view of nature, may lead some to 
ĐŽŶĐůƵĚĞǁŝƚŚĐĞƌƚĂŝŶǁĂǇƐŽĨŬŶŽǁŝŶŐ ?ƚŚĞƌĞŵŽǀŝŶŐŽĨĚŽƵďƚŽƌĞƐĐĂƌƚĞƐ ?ĚƵĂůŝƐŵ ?ĂŶĚ
epistemologies, but as we argue, the relationship between metaphysics, epistemology and 
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related research methods in the IS field is not as clear. Metaphysical assumptions do tend to be 
exclusionary since they usually relate to the discipline as a whole rather than a specific practice 
or agreement among scientists concerning their research. For example, phlogistic chemistry 
implies a certain metaphysical characteristic of the nature of chemistry as a discipline, preferring 
specific epistemological views, pushing aside other views that the discipline might adopt.  
These examples illustrate a subtle distinction that is missed in IS circles when talking about 
paradigms. A comparison of how the IS field uses the paradigm concept in Table 1 with the 
Kuhnian paradigms in Table 2 demonstrates the difference between the paradigm itself and the 
philosophy underlying the paradigm. For example, Aristotelian dynamics is the paradigm 
whereas, Aristotelian metaphysics ?ƚŚĂƚŝƐ ?ƚŚĞ “ĞƐƐĞŶĐĞƐŽĨŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůďŽĚŝĞƐ ? (Kuhn, 1970b, p. 
104), underlie it. And as we showed earlier, it is the conflation of paradigm with philosophy that 
became the source of confusion among researchers in IS. In the IS field, the metaphysical 
paradigms mistakenly take the form of epistemology or the theory of knowledge, as in the case 
of whether or not an external, independent world exists. Thus, following Chua (1986), 
Orlikowski and Baroudi (1991) categorize IS research epistemologies into positivist, interpretive 
or critical paradigms. 
Sociological Paradigm 
Instead of belief systems that operate throughout the entire discipline, DĂƐƚĞƌŵĂŶ ?Ɛ 
sociological senses of the paradigm allude to different multi-faceted sources of influences within 
the scientific community. Sociological paradigms can take the shape of contrasting forces as 
different as scientific achievements, sociological bases that hold a political institution together, 
accepted judicial decisions or grammatical usage. Thus, the examples of sociological paradigms 
ŝŶ<ƵŚŶ ?ƐStructure point to the actual practices of the community, intellectually (scientific 
progress), politically (institutions), legally (judicial decisions) or linguistically (grammatical 
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usage)(Masterman, 1970). These practices are recognized as the bases for future work. The 
concept of the sociological paradigm was reemphasized by Kuhn himself in his response to his 
critics (Postscript  W 1969) when he wrote ĂďŽƵƚ “ƚŚĞƐŽĐŝŽůŽŐŝĐĂů ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? ? ? “^ĐŝĞŶƚŝĨŝĐ
ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐĐĂŶĂŶĚƐŚŽƵůĚďĞŝƐŽůĂƚĞĚǁŝƚŚŽƵƚƉƌŝŽƌƌĞĐŽƵƌƐĞƚŽƉĂƌĂĚŝŐŵƐ ?ďǇƐĐƌƵƚŝnizing 
ƚŚĞďĞŚĂǀŝŽƌŽĨĂŐŝǀĞŶĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ? (p. 176). 
In Structure, when a community of researchers rallied around Benjamin Franklin ?s paradigm of 
 “conservation of charges, ? they based their research on the assumption that electricity is never 
created but  “ĐŽůůĞĐƚĞĚ ? ?This social construction bounded early researchers of electricity into a 
ĚŝƐƚŝŶŐƵŝƐŚĂďůĞƐĐŝĞŶƚŝĨŝĐĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ?ŝƌŽŶŝĐĂůůǇĐĂůůĞĚƚŚĞ “ĞůĞĐƚƌŝĐŝĂŶƐ ? ?<ƵŚŶ ? ? ? ? ?ď ? ? This
sociological paradigm is formalized as the Law of Conservation of Charge, the principle behind 
many inventions and future progress in the study of electricity. Unlike the earlier metaphysical 
paradigms, the  “conservation of charges ? paradigm does not lend itself towards characterizing 
the nature of the whole discipline of physics; instead, it forms the basis for specialization within 
the discipline for many researchers over a long period of time. The same sense of the paradigm 
can be seen in the achievements surrounding the different research communities ascribing to 
the corpuscular theory or wave theory of light in physics. ƵƌŝŶŐEĞǁƚŽŶ ?ƐƚŝŵĞ ?ŝƚǁĂƐƚŚĞ
community that subscribed to the corpuscular paradigm that held sway, even though a smaller 
community of researchers that held the view of light being a wave phenomenon existed at the 
same time. Such paradigms are not limited to scientific discoveries. Judicial decisions taking the 
form of legal precedence in common law sets a standard for future decisions, which is a 
sociological paradigm that ensures consistent treatment for future legal cases. Research 
following sociological paradigms are not uncommon in IS; for example, historically, IS research 
adopted several sociological paradigms from other disciplines in the past including the decision-
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making paradigm, information processing paradigm, and the strategic management paradigm, 
all which dominated research in IS for many years. 
Conceptual and Artefactual Paradigm 
DĂƐƚĞƌŵĂŶ ?Ɛ third sense of the paradigm term is the conceptual or artefactual paradigm, its 
most concrete component. It is considered both conceptual and artefactual since in many cases 
paradigmatic concepts take the form of artifacts in the shape of tools and instruments. Kuhn 
(1970b) ƌĞĨĞƌƐŽĨƚĞŶƚŽŚŽǁƉĂƌĂĚŝŐŵƐŽĨĨĞƌ “ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂůĂŶĚŝŶƐƚƌƵŵĞŶƚĂůƚŽŽůƐ ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚ
even describes how certain tools (e.g. weighing tools) insulate or distract scientists from 
solutions. Examples of conceptual and artefactual paradigms provided in Structure include 
classical works that expound the general body of theory, usually in the form of textbooks of the 
field (e.g. Ptolemy ?s Almagest and Newton ?s Opticks); the standard procedures used for the 
discovery of elements; instrumentation and machine-factory tools. In this sense, the paradigm 
becomes like a tool or apparatus for problem solving. The common threads that bind all of these 
different artefactual paradigms are their shared nature, the agreement required for their 
adoption and application, the commitment shown to them by the community, often their 
obscurity, and their temporality (Masterman, 1970). 
It is tempting to view artefactual paradigms as physical objects that are merely applied in 
research. What makes these concrete objects paradigms has to do with the knowledge 
embedded in them as a result of years of efforts and discoveries, the metaphysics assumed for 
the objects they are studying, and subsequent agreement of the community of scientists 
responsible for those discoveries. An example of a paradigmatic tool is the instrument used for 
X-ray crystallography, which became the critical tool of discovery of the double helix shape of 
DNA (Garfield, et al., 1964). Among the most famous example of a technique as an artefactual 
ƉĂƌĂĚŝŐŵŝƐ>ŽǁƌǇĞƚĂů ?Ɛ(1951) technique for determining the quantity of protein in a cell In the 
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IS field which fetched 300,000 citations. In IS several artefactual paradigms exist, for example, 
decision support systems that became the basis for much research progress in IS. A more recent 
example of artefactual paradigms are the Internet search technologies that are made famous by 
companies such as Yahoo and Google. The early paradigm of searching involved the user finding 
ƚŚŝŶŐƐŽŶƚŚĞ/ŶƚĞƌŶĞƚƐŝŶĐĞŶŽŽŶĞŬŶĞǁǁŚĂƚǁĂƐŽƵƚƚŚĞƌĞ ?EŽǁƚŚĂƚǁĞŬŶŽǁƌŽƵŐŚůǇǁŚĂƚ ?Ɛ
out there, companies like Amazon are applying a different paradigm of searching ? a discovery-
based search where the things find us ? as in AmĂǌŽŶ ?Ɛ “ƉĞŽƉůĞǁŚŽďŽƵŐŚƚǇŽƵƌƉƌŽĚƵĐƚĂůƐŽ
ďŽƵŐŚƚ ? ?(Battelle, 2005). 
Conceptual paradigms in the form of textbooks are not as common in the IS field. Although the 
IS field had adopted a classic text in the past (Davis & Olson, 1985), there are no set of classic 
textbooks on IS that command the same stature as the classics in biology, chemistry, or 
sociology. Also, there are no standard procedures or techniques that can be considered IS-
specific. The quest in defining the  “IT artifact ? (Orlikowski & Iacono, 2001; Weber, 2003) may be 
viewed as a search for these kinds of paradigms in IS. 
Masterman ?s (1970) interpretation of the Kuhnian paradigm highlights the common thread 
between them ? the practical more so than the philosophical elements of scientific practice. In 
fact, Masterman (1970) opined that Kuhn ?s paradigm is the practical rather than its 
metaphysical sense ( “Philosophically speaking, a paradigm is an artifact which can be used as a 
puzzle-solving device; not a metaphysical world-view ?, p. 68), for  “only with an artifact can you 
solve puzzles ? (p. 70, original emphasis). This more practical view of the Kuhnian paradigm can 
be clearly seen in Kuhn ?Ɛ elaboration of his conception of the paradigm in the postscript to 
Structure (Kuhn, 1970b) and in a later book  W The Essential Tension (Kuhn, 1977). He accepted 
that he had indeed been somewhat profligate in his usage of the term and suggested that there 
were two primary senses of the term, a general one and a specific one. The general one is  “what 
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the members of a scientific community, and they alone, share. Conversely, it is their possession 
of a common paradigm that constitutes a scientific community ? (p. 294). To avoid confusion, he 
suggested using a more specific term, the  “disciplinary matrix ?  W disciplinary because it is shared 
within a discipline, and matrix because it consists of several practical components. The 
components are: 
1. Symbolic generalizations, i.e., formal expressions carrying logical declarations in propositional 
form that are shared unquestioningly by the community. Kuhn ?s examples were scientific 
formulas expressed in symbols (e.g. f=ma) ŽƌǁŽƌĚƐ ? “ĂĐƚŝŽŶŝƐĞƋƵĂůƚŽƌĞĂĐƚŝŽŶ ? ?, as he wrote 
mostly using examples from the natural sciences. The significance of these symbolic 
generalizations lay in enabling researchers to attach powerful logical and mathematical 
manipulations in their puzzle-solving efforts, their ability to explain the behavior associated with 
those symbols as well as simultaneously ascribing community-wide definitions to the symbols. 
Much of these symbolic generalizations are found in the natural and positive sciences (e.g. 
Nobel prize winning Black-Scholes option pricing formula). ŶĞǆĂŵƉůĞƚŚĂƚ ?ƐĂƉƉůŝĞĚŝŶƚŚĞ/^
ĨŝĞůĚŝƐŽĚĚ ?Ɛ(1970) database normal forms as the engineering paradigm for databases.  
2. Models, i.e., specific analogies or even ontologies that the group shares about its objects of 
study. For example, in IS, the classic Gorry and Scott Morton ?s (1971) conception of  “structured 
decisions ? vs.  “ƵŶƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞĚĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞŝƌƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉƐŝŶƐƉŝƌĞĚĨƌŽŵ^ŝŵŽŶ ?Ɛ(1960) 
rational decision making model, was influential within the IS community towards understanding 
decision making. <ĞŶŶĞƚŚŽƵůĚŝŶŐ ?Ɛ (1955) classic hierarchy of information consisting of data, 
information and knowledge, forms an accepted model and paradigm for understanding 
information. Keil ?s (2000; 1999) work on  “project escalation ? and  “runaway systems ? uses the 
ladder metaphor to describe increasing levels of intensity of a problem, and the  “runaway train ? 
metaphor to describe systems that are hurtling out of control. 
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3. Values, ƚŚĞ “ƚŚŝƌĚƐŽƌƚŽĨĞůĞŵĞŶƚŝŶƚŚĞĚŝƐĐŝƉůŝŶĂƌǇŵĂƚƌŝǆ ?(Kuhn, 1970b, p. 184) concerns 
subjective judgment of the community about their research methods, how theories are 
evaluated, and the goals of science. These values may be applied in different ways within the 
community, but ƚŚĞǇƵůƚŝŵĂƚĞůǇĐŚĂƌƚƚŚĞĨŝĞůĚ ?ƐĚŝƌĞĐƚŝŽŶ ?During the early history of IS when 
influential members of the IS field were inducted from diverse backgrounds, Farhoomand (1987) 
thought it would take time for the field to arrive at a consensus on its set of values. More recent 
evidence suggests that the IS field had quickly showed preference for quantitative and 
statistical-type research for publications as evidence of rigor and predictive accuracy (Becker & 
Niehaves, 2007; Chen & Hirschheim, 2004; Hirschheim & Klein, 2012). 
4. Exemplars. In his Postscript to Structure, Kuhn emphasizes that the  “ĨŽƵƌƚŚƐŽƌƚŽĨĞůĞŵĞŶƚ ? ?
also the  “ŵŽƐƚŶŽǀĞůĂŶĚůĞĂƐƚƵŶĚĞƌƐƚŽŽĚĂƐƉĞĐƚŽĨƚŚĞďŽŽŬ ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? ?ŝƐƚŚĞƉĂƌĂĚŝŐŵĂƐ
exemplar. Kuhn (1977) says, it was this sense, in the form of examples of successful practice that 
a community shared, that inspired his original idea for paradigms (p. 318). As he puts it, 
 “ǆĞŵƉůĂƌƐ ?ĨŝŶĂůůǇ ?ĂƌĞĐŽŶĐƌĞƚĞƉƌoblem solutions, accepted by the group as, in a quite usual 
sense, paradigmatic ? (p. 298). Unfortunately, he let the term expand to include all the other 
forms of group commitment. Exemplars as concrete solutions to particular problems (or as Kuhn 
refer to ĂƐ “ĐŽŶĐƌĞƚĞƉƌŽďůĞŵ ƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?serve as the basis for solving other problems by 
providing an analogy or metaphor for the puzzle. These concrete problem solutions can come 
from the community in the form of established paradigms or from creative individuals who 
undertake research that challenge existing paradigms, or invent theories that contribute to the 
emergence of a new paradigm for the field. For example, DĞŶĚĞů ?Ɛ(1865) new paradigm for 
biology came from experiments that he individually performed without any community support. 
In fact the community of biologists took nearly half of century to accept his new paradigm 
(Brannigan, 1979). 
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A classic IS example of an artefactual paradigm is the decision support systems (DSS) (Alter, 
1977; Keen, 1987), which for decades provided solutions to decision making problems at 
different levels  and different domains within the organization (Keen, 1981;1987;1991; Keen & 
Scott Morton, 1978). Despite deriving its inspiration from outside the field (the organizational 
sciences and their decision-making paradigm), this concrete scientific problem-solution or 
exemplar became the inspiration for other productive developments within the IS field including 
the classic research program of group decision support systems (GDSS) (DeSanctis & Gallupe, 
1987; Watson, et al., 1988) and the very lucrative executive information systems (EIS) 
applications (Rockart & DeLong, 1988; Watson, et al., 1991).  To highlight the differences 
between adopting epistemology as paradigms, and examples of sociological and 
artefactual/conceptual paradigms, we list examples of such paradigms related to IS in Table 3. 





Notes and major references 
Decision making 
(psychology) 
Sociological A psychological paradigm that focus on computers as enabling 
decision making processes. It is among the earliest paradigms 
adopted by the IS field (Gorry & Scott Morton, 1971; Mason & 
Mitroff, 1973) and carried IS research for over three decades (Keen, 





Among the earliest applications that were researched. The 
Minnesota Experiments set the standard for experimental research 
in the IS field based on an IT artifact (Alter, 1977; DeSanctis & 







Drawing from Chua (1986), Orlikowski and Baroudi (1991) adopt 
these paradigms for IS research and has become the received view 
of the choices for research paradigms in IS 
Social-psychology 
(instance of the 
behavioral 
paradigm) 
Sociological ĂǀŝƐ ?(1989) influential work on technology acceptance model 
(TAM) applies social-psychology principles for technology adoption 
Functionalism Metaphysical 
and 
Hirschheim et al (1995, p. 9)  “ĂĚŽƉƚĂƉĂƌĂĚŝŐŵĂƚŝĐĂƐƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶ
analysis following the work of Burrell and Morgan (1979) ?ĨŽƌ/^
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epistemological development. Functionalism is considered the most developed of 
ƚŚĞĨŽƵƌƵƌƌĞůůĂŶĚDŽƌŐĂŶ ?Ɛ(1979) paradigms within IS. 
Information 
processing 
Sociological A cognitive paradigm that is based on human thinking and learning 
and became the basis for organization design (Galbraith, 1973;1977; 
Huber & McDaniel, 1986) and other research areas such as media 
richness and the IS success model. 
Strategic 
management 
Sociological ŵĞƌŐĞĚĨƌŽŵWŽƌƚĞƌ ?ƐƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚstudies and led 
research on the IS/IT as competitive weapon (Ives & Learmouth, 






ŽƵůĚŝŶŐ ?Ɛ(1955) classic hierarchy of information consisting of data, 
information and knowledge, forms an accepted model and paradigm 





Keil ?Ɛ(1995; 1999) ǁŽƌŬŽŶ “ƉƌŽũĞĐƚĞƐĐĂůĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚ “ƌƵŶĂǁĂǇ
ƐǇƐƚĞŵƐ ?ƵƐĞƐƚŚĞůĂĚĚĞƌŵĞƚĂƉŚŽƌƚŽĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐůĞǀĞůƐŽĨ
intensity of a project undergoing crisis 
Behavioral science Metaphysical 
and 
epistemological 
Paradigm that seeks to develop and verify theories that explain or 
predict human or organizational behavior (Hevner, et al., 2004) 




Paradigm that seeks to extend the boundaries of human and 
organizational capabilities by creating new and innovative artifacts 
(Hevner, et al., 2004). 
 
The organizational sciences went through several paradigm battles as can be seen in 
ŽŶĂůĚƐŽŶ ?Ɛ(1985) defense of traditional, positivist theories of management:  “^ŽĐŝŽůŽŐŝĐĂů
discourse has come often to be preoccupied with the struggle between world-views of structural-
functionalism and conflict theory ? (p. x). Sometimes the battles surrounding paradigms can be 
intense, as what happened between Pfeffer (1993; 1995) and Van Maanen (1995a;1995b) on 
the need for pluralism in management. No less intense was the battle between the defenders of 
the incommensurability thesis of paradigms (Jackson & Carter, 1991;1993), and those who find 
no issue of  “paradigm ? ?ŵĞĂning epistemological) interplay and integrated theoretical 
development across different epistemological sense of paradigms (Gioia & Pitre, 1990; Willmott, 
1993). Notwithstanding the powerful arguments each side puts forward to support their 
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respective positions, because both sides share the common epistemological interpretation of 
the Kuhnian paradigm, their proposals rarely go beyond between choosing or compromising on 
some kind of worldview and method. 
As one of the reference disciplines of IS (Culnan, 1986;1987; Davis & Olson, 1985), the 
organizational sciences exert a powerful influence on the IS field (Grover, et al., 2006b; 
Orlikowski & Barley, 2001). Scholars from the IS field regularly publish in major journals in the 
organizational sciences and attend management conferences. This is not surprising considering 
ƚŚĞĨŝĞůĚ ?ƐŽƌŝŐŝŶƐĂŶĚƚŚĞŶĂŵĞŽĨƚŚĞĨŝĞůĚitself  W  “Management Information SǇƐƚĞŵƐ ? ?
Perhaps because of the diversity of influences within IS, the IS field may have only experienced 
paradigm skirmishes rather than paradigm wars. Nevertheless, the hegemony of the 
epistemological sense of the paradigm was felt through the many years the IFIP community 
struggled to introduce the IS field to alternative epistemological and methodological approaches 
(Mumford, et al., 1985; Nissen, et al., 1991). 
Goles and Hirschheim (2000) suggest that the war may be over, and the field needs to be more 
ƉƌĂŐŵĂƚŝĐŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽƌĞĐůĂŝŵƚŚĞĨŝĞůĚ ?ƐƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĂůƌĞůĞǀĂŶĐĞǁŝƚŚƉƌĂĐƚŝƚŝŽŶĞƌƐ ?DŝŶŐĞƌƐ(2004) 
describes this experience as a 20-year battle between the imperialists, isolationists, and 
pluralists that is experiencing a ceasefire. Even though segments of the IS community embrace 
these alternative approaches, little change is seen in the majority of research undertaken in IS 
(Chen & Hirschheim, 2004). This purported lack of change may be symptomatic of not only a 
continued presence of the hegemony of positivism as the epistemological approach of choice, 
but also the inability of the field to escape the incommensurability gridlock produced by the 
conflation of paradigms with epistemology. A notable exception of the paradigm view is Dando 
ĞƚĂů ?Ɛ(1981) penetrative analysis of the crises that overtook the operational research (OR) field 
and how they prognosticated the closing down of OR departments in schools of business across 
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America. ƐĂŶĚŽĞƚĂů ?ƐĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐƐŚŽǁs, a field that is faced with an either-or choice between a 
few discrete epistemological approaches is unlikely to invent novel and creative insights 
concerning its diverse phenomena of interest. 
 
Positivism Interpretivism 
Critical Research Constructivism 
Closed ended epistemological choices in IS 
 
  
Open ended paradigm shifts in economics 
Figure 1: Between limited philosophical choices and limitless paradigm shifts 
 
In response to allegations that the Kuhnian paradigm applies only to the natural sciences, we 
ŽĨĨĞƌ&ŽƵĐĂƵůƚ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? ?ƉĂƌĂĚŝŐŵĂƚŝĐĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐŽĨƚŚĞĚŝƐĐŝƉůŝŶĞŽĨĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƐ ?ĂƐŽĐŝĂůƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ?
comparison of the development of the discipline of economics with the IS field highlights the 
difference between limited epistemologies in IS with a discipline that is inspired by continuing 
series of paradigm shifts taking place about every 20-30 years (Figure 1). 
Foucault (1970)4 describes how different communities in economics each adopts different 
paradigms in their effort to theorize on economic value and prices, beginning with coinage, 
moving on to mercantilism and labor to the more sophisticated factors of production, 
                                                          
4 dŚĞĚĞƉŝĐƚŝŽŶĞǆƚĞŶĚƐ&ŽƵĐĂƵůƚ ?ƐĚĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝŽŶďǇŝŶĐůuding Keynesian economics and monetarism as a 
continuation of economic theory 
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macroeconomics, and later monetarism. This depiction of the progress in economics shows how 
scholars of economics invent and construct different explanations and theories for economic 
phenomenon, each enacting a different paradigm. This progress can be contrasted with 
research that is limited to epistemological categories. The categorization of IS research into a 
handful of methodological systems has become so deeply embedded in the discourse on IS 
research that they have become ideal types for research and are the subject of numerous 
articles and special issues of IS journals (Hovorka & Lee, 2010). It is important to note that we do 
not claim that the adoption of the epistemological sense of the paradigm is the sole cause that is 
holding back IS research. As mentioned earlier, research is a highly complex endeavor and many 
causal factors can simultaneously impact IS research. The epistemological sense of the paradigm 
encourages exclusionary polemical tendencies alongside other negative practices such as 
excessive borrowing, incremental gap-spotting research, and scripted approaches that engender 
 “ďŽǆĞĚ-ŝŶ ? research (Alvesson & Sandberg, 2014). 
Why then do researchers in the sociological and educational sciences, and our own IS field, tend 
to gravitate towards the epistemological sense of the paradigm to seek research ideas? 
Masterman (1970) says it is because these researchers do not take Kuhn's account of normal 
science seriously. What she means by this is the tendency to depend on the epistemological so 
much that they have forgotten to allow for the material and practical, which is a large part of 
normal science, to guide the research. The nature of the scientific system as "a marriage 
between metaphysics and technology" (p. 71) has somewhat being passed over by a focus on 
the metaphysics alone, exemplified by a dependence on blind methods. Based on the necessity 
of the practical in inspiring new thinking in science, Masterman (1970) contends that it is in fact 
the conceptual and artifact sense that Kuhn meant in his paradigm concept. 
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Benefits of the Transformative Paradigm 
The Kuhnian paradigm, when adopted in its transformative form, establishes the correct balance 
of metaphysical, sociological and artefactual components, encourages inclusion rather than 
exclusion, and engenders innovative research. The Kuhnian paradigm has already benefitted 
numerous disciplines, from some of which, ironically, the IS field itself derive inspiration. tĞ ?ǀĞ
already noted earlier ŚŽǁ<ƵŚŶ ?ƐŝĚĞĂƐŝŶƐƉŝƌĞĚƐƚƵĚŝĞƐƐƵƌƌŽƵŶĚŝŶŐƚŚĞŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶƌĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ?
Berger and Luckmann (1966) credits Kuhn for inspiring their understanding of the social 
construction of reality. In sociology, Ritzer (1980) is indebted to Kuhn for his multi-paradigm 
perspective of that field. In the cognitive sciences, De Mey (1982) titles his work The Cognitive 
Paradigm and elaborates on how paradigm detection studies  “ŐƌĞĂƚůǇĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚĞƐƚŽŽƵƌ
understanding of the social side of the paradigm concept ? (p. 105). <ƵŚŶ ?ƐStructure inspired top 
universities around the world including the University of California Berkeley and Cornell 
University to found policy-oriented programs that brought multiple perspectives from historians 
of science and philosophers to join their new Science and Technology Studies programs 
(Sismondo, 2003). 
Bloor (1997), in defending Kuhn against charges of relativism and pure idealism, states, "Perhaps 
the most shameful of all misunderstandings was the idea that, for Kuhn, science has no 
significant contact within independent reality" (p. 124). Political scientists, religious scholars and 
artists have all benefited from the Kuhnian model (Perry, 1977). Cognitive historian Edwin 
Boring (1964) ĂŶĂůŽŐŝǌĞƐ<ƵŚŶ ?ƐƉĂƌĂĚŝŐŵĂŶĚŝŶĐŽŵŵĞŶƐƵƌĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŚĞƐŝƐƚŽƚŚĞŶŽƚŝŽŶŽĨ
 “ĐŽŐŶŝƚŝǀĞĚŝƐƐŽŶĂŶĐĞ ?ŝŶĐŽŐŶŝƚŝǀĞƉƐǇĐŚology. Marvin Minsky (1975), among the pioneers of 
artificial intelligence, admits his debt to Kuhn for his frame theory and writes,  “dŚĞďĂƐŝĐĨƌĂŵĞ
idea itself is not particularly original WŝƚŝƐŝŶƚŚĞƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ƐĐŚĞŵĂ ?ŽĨĂƌƚůĞƚƚĂŶĚƚŚĞ
 ‘ƉĂƌĂĚŝŐŵƐ ?ŽĨ<ƵŚŶ ?(p. 113). 
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As a result of their preoccupation with epistemology, the organizational sciences fields have 
already suffered through unnecessary paradigm wars. The IS field has also undergone its own 
version of battles and arguably, certain communities of IS researchers that favor specific 
philosophical approaches may still be at odds with other communities that favor different 
approaches. dŚĞƐĞ “Ɛkirmishes ? between opposing philosophies continue albeit in a language 
that does not directly mention paradigms or epistemologies (Mutch, 2013; Scott & Orlikowski, 
2013), but are nevertheless philosophical in nature. To prevent future gridlock, we recommend 
that the IS community abandon this practice of classifying, designing and evaluating research 
based on epistemology, and adopt a more transformative interpretation of the paradigm that 
incorporates the metaphysical, sociological and conceptual components. In addition to other 
examples earlier of how paradigm shifts have benefitted the IS field, we follow the development 
of social construction of technology (SCOT) studies, a source of inspiration for several IS studies 
(Davidson, 2002; Doherty, et al., 2006; Orlikowski, 1992;2000; Walsham, 1997) to illustrate the 
potential the Kuhnian paradigm for IS research. At the same time, we will refer to the 
development of several paradigm within the IS field itself. Although SCOT itself is not yet a 
paradigm within the IS field, it has triggered a paradigm shift within the field of science and 
technology studies. As Bijker (1995) ĞǆƉůĂŝŶƐƚŚĞďĂƐŝƐŽĨŚŝƐĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨƚŚĞ “ƚĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐŝĐĂů
ĨƌĂŵĞ ? ?ŚĞŶŽƚĞƐ P “dŚĞĂŶĂůŽŐǇǁŝƚŚ<ƵŚŶ ?Ɛ ‘ƉĂƌĂĚŝŐŵ ? ?ĂŵŽŶŐŽƚŚĞƌĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƐ ?ŝƐŽďǀŝŽƵƐ ? ?Ɖ ?
 ? ? ? ? ? “dĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐŝĐĂůĨƌĂŵĞŝƐĞǀŝĚĞŶƚůǇŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞŵĂŶǇĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶŽĨ<ƵŚŶ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? ?ĚŝƐĐŝƉůŝŶĂƌǇ
ŵĂƚƌŝǆ ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? ?ŵƵĐŚůŝŬĞŽůůŝŶƐĂŶĚWŝŶĐŚ ?Ɛ(1982)  “ĨƌĂŵĞŽĨŵĞĂŶŝŶŐ ? ?ŽŶƐƚĂŶƚ ?Ɛ(1980) 
 “ƚĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐŝĐĂůƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶ ? ? ZŽƐĞŶďĞƌŐ ?Ɛ(1976)  “ĨŽĐƵƐŝŶŐĚĞǀŝĐĞƐ ? ?'ƵƚƚŝŶŐ ?Ɛ(1980)  “ƚĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐŝĐĂů
paradiŐŵ ? ?ĂŶĚ:ĞŶŬŝŶƐ ?(1975)  “ƚĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐŝĐĂůŵŝŶĚ-ƐĞƚ ? ?In the following subsections, we 
describe the benefits of marshalling all the components of the Kuhnian paradigm, its 
metaphysical, sociological and conceptual/artefactual components. 
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Benefit#1: Engender Cumulative Tradition 
The Kuhnian paradigm contains in-built mechanisms that encourage cumulativeness. As Kuhn 
(1970b) states (p. 23): 
A paradigm is rarely an object for replication. Instead, like an accepted judicial 
decision in the common law, it is an object for further articulation and 
specification under new or more stringent conditions. 
Instead of replicating paradigms from reference disciplines, as can be seen in most research in IS 
(Grover & Lyytinen, 2015), a realization or discovery of alternative paradigms opens doors for IS 
researchers to build cumulative tradition and transition into extraordinary science. The first step 
in this direction starts with a recognition of the existing paradigms operating within the field. 
Opportunities for adding knowledge in the field can only be seen when the members of the field 
are cognizant of the underlying paradigms (Slife & Williams, 1995). Once the underlying 
paradigms are clear to researchers, work on alternative paradigms will not merely replicate the 
status quo; instead it will articulate and specify new approaches that build cumulative tradition. 
Bijker ?Ɛ (1995) work in developing the SCOT approach demonstrated the process of developing 
alternative paradigms to an existing mainstream paradigm within science and technology 
studies (STS). Up to the 1970s and 1980s, STS were concerned with the social impact of science 
and technology on society, a form of technological determinism (Bijker, 1995) that focused on 
their negative implications (e.g. nuclear arms proliferation, environmental degradation). In the 
mid-1980s, studies began suggesting a paradigm shift in the opposite direction towards the 
impact of society on technology ? a technological paradigm. The existing paradigm of STS was 
considered inadequate in explaining the inherently social nature of technology (MacKenzie & 
Wajcman, 1985; Winner, 1980). To explain this different paradigm in thinking about 
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sociotechnical change, Bijker and colleagues (Bijker, et al., 1987; Pinch & Bijker, 1984) developed 
a new way of unpacking technology  “ƚŽƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚƚŚĞƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐǇĂŶĚ
ƐŽĐŝĞƚǇĂŶĚƚŽĂĐƚŽŶŝƐƐƵĞƐŽĨƐŽĐŝŽƚĞĐŚŶŝĐĂůĐŚĂŶŐĞ ?(Bijker, 1995, p. 6). This approach involves 
focusing on the concrete problem-solution, uncovering the strategies taken by relevant social 
groups to resolve those problems, and the artifacts that emerge as a result of the inter- and 
intra-group relations. 
In the IS field, Doherty et al. (2006) demonstrate an example of this new approach, extending 
Orlikowski ?Ɛ (1992) study of the role of iŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚŝǀĞĨůĞǆŝďŝůŝƚǇ ?ŽŶĞŽĨ^Kd ?ƐƉĂƌĂĚŝŐŵĂƚŝĐ
concepts. ŽŚĞƌƚǇĞƚĂů ?Ɛ(2006) case study focused on the problem of a nationwide 
implementation of a healthcare management system and how stakeholders interpreted that 
implementation in different ways (i.e., empowering versus controlling) causing various 
organizational conflicts. The results of the study showed how modifications are introduced and 
meanings get embedded into the design of the artefact as a result of the different 
interpretations in what Bijker (1995, p. 84) calls  “closure ? and  “stabilization ? of the 
technological artifact. This study demonstrates how uncovering the sociological and conceptual 
paradigms deliver new insights into the limits and opportunities of human choice and systems 
design. 
Benefit#2: Opening Space for Alternative Views 
Instead of the few mutually exclusive philosophical approaches that squeeze out innovative 
views, the more concrete version of the paradigm frees the IS field from the time-consuming 
and debilitating debates on whether the study is correctly monist or pluralist, positivist or 
interpretivist, idealist or critical realist, all of which tend to exclude opposing approaches and 
inflame unnecessary and unproductive intra-community quarrels. With no epistemological 
doctrine to defend, the focus of the research returns to its core, channeling efforts towards 
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progressing their research. As Maxwell (2013, p. 39) describes this work of theorizing, the 
research framework and the resulting paradigm, is like a "coat closet" allowing the researcher to 
hang different, seemingly unconnected ideas and concepts of a paradigm in a neatly organized 
and coherent fashion. Because a research community can rally around a paradigm that can be as 
simple as an instrument, space is opened up for a more elegant and parsimonious model instead 
of complex, unwieldy box-arrow diagrams. The presence of a paradigm does not mean that the 
research is entirely determined by any specific set of rules necessarily. The error in stating that 
paradigms rigidly determine a specific direction (Banville & Landry, 1989) assumes that 
researchers are somehow tied to certain rules. Kuhn (1970b) rejects this view by emphasizing 
shared paradigms, not shared rules, as a source of coherence for normal research ?dŚŝƐ “ƐƚƌŽŶŐ
network of commitments ?ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂů ?ƚŚĞŽƌĞƚŝĐĂů ?ŝŶƐƚƌƵŵĞŶƚĂů ?ĂŶĚŵĞƚŚŽĚŽůŽŐŝĐĂů ?ĚĞĨŝŶĞ
the shared paradigm that generates the rules, since "[R]ules, I suggest, derive from paradigms, 
but paradigms can guide research even in the absence of rules" (p. 42, added emphasis). Since 
philosophical approaches take a back seat to paradigms, the paradigm becomes capable of 
achieving a balance between the unified and the diverse, the monist and the pluralist, the 
critical realist and the idealist. 
As Smith (2006) ŶŽƚĞƐ ?ŝƚŝƐƚŚĞ “ůŝŵŝƚĞĚƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚŝĐĂůĐŚŽŝĐĞƐƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĞƌƐŚĂǀĞĚƌĂǁŶĨƌŽŵƚŽ
ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĐĂƵƐĂůŝƚǇƚŚĂƚ ?ƐƵƐƚĂŝŶƐƚŚe unproductive debate about whether the social or technical 
is the cause. Opening up the issues of causality between technology and society to alternative 
views, both Bijker (1995, pp. 14-15) and, Markus and Robey (1988) agree that the causal 
structure between technology and people is emergent, and to that Bijker (1995, pp. 14-15) adds; 
technology works not just because of any intrinsic property of the technology (i.e., the 
characteristics of the IT artifact become the explanans), rather why it works in a social setting 
requires explanation (i.e., the characteristics of the IT artifact become the explanandum). Thus, 
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the success or failure of the IS are to be explained symmetrically using the same balanced 
framework, not tied to any metaphysical positivist or interpretive  “paradigm ? that views 
technological change as based on either determinism or volunteerism (Leonardi & Barley, 2010). 
The old paradigm might attribute success primarily to the quality of the system (Delone & 
McLean, 1992), or attribute failure primarily from not paying attention to social and behavioral 
issues (Lucas, 1975). The new paradigm which includes sociological and artefactual concerns 
allows the researcher to provide a more symmetrical explanation that focuses on the success of 
the technology as an achievement contingent on numerous different material, social, and 
political factors, all of which emergently explain both success or failure. 
 
Benefit#3: Enrich Theorizing Efforts 
Researching without clearly understanding the hidden assumptions and paradigms subjects the 
field to the dictates of specific reference disciplines. A field that depends blindly on the 
paradigms of its reference disciplines can never be expected to go beyond the limits and 
blinders imposed by those paradigms. Within the organizational sciences, Burns and StalŬĞƌ ?Ɛ
(1961) integration of the organismic paradigm from biology into management to invent the 
concept of the organic versus mechanistic organizational structures is an example of an 
innovative use of paradigms. In this instance, the notion of organism in biology takes on a whole 
new paradigm that allowed the authors to theorize about the sources of innovation ? a concept 
that is not strictly biological. Their adaptation was not guided by epistemological considerations. 
There was nothing positivist or interpretive in how they applied biological metaphors. In other 
words, the authors did not merely borrow from biology, they allowed the paradigms in biology 
to enrich their theorizing efforts. 
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Unlike ƵƌŶƐĂŶĚ^ƚĂůŬĞƌ ?Ɛ(1961) adaptation of biological paradigms, IS adopts its paradigms 
from the organizational sciences in a more wholesale fashion. This wholesale adoption can be 
seen in the history of the IS field beginning with the decision making paradigm of the early 
1970s (Keen, 1987) to the strategic management (or competitive advantage) paradigm of the 
1980s (Porter & Millar, 1985) and the business process (Davenport & Short, 1990) as well as the 
social-psychology paradigm (Davis, 1989) of the 1990s. They were useful, allowed IS to leverage 
off studies from its reference disciplines, but ĞƐƐĞŶƚŝĂůůǇƚŝĞƚŚĞ/^ĨŝĞůĚ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌŝǌŝŶŐto those 
disciplines. Even if new concepts were invented in the process, those concepts are unlikely to go 
beyond the bounds of the organizational sciences. Instead of borrowing wholesale, a creative 
adaptation of those existing paradigms might allow IS researchers to found concepts, models 
and theories that are not as bounded to their reference disciplines. For instance, instead of 
adopting parts of the paradigm from social psychology (Davis, 1989), an IS researcher interested 
in adoption or acceptance of technology can benefit from an adaptation of both social 
psychology and communications of innovation (Rogers, 1983), the latter of which is a 
communications theory for the diffusion of technology. By uncovering the metaphysical, 
sociological and artefactual components of these two paradigms, IS researchers can enrich their 
theorizing process for the acceptance of technology. 
The technological frame concept introduced by Bijker et al. (1995; 1987) for analyzing 
technological change is an example of teasing out the metaphysical, sociological and artefactual 
paradigms in order to enable productive adaptation. Bijker (1995) uncovers the underlying 
paradigm of technological phenomena by breaking them down into their components consisting 
of goals, key problems, problem-ƐŽůǀŝŶŐƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĞƐ ?ĐƵƌƌĞŶƚƚŚĞŽƌŝĞƐ ?ƚĂĐŝƚŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ ?ƵƐĞƌƐ ?
practices, exemplary artifacts and other artefactual models and analogies. Early applications of 
the frame concept in IS were limited to its more socio-cognitive dimensions that focus on 
 44 
 “ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐŝŶĞǆƉĞĐƚĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĂƐƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶƐ ?ŽƌŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞĂďŽƵƚƐŽŵĞŬĞǇĂƐƉĞĐƚƐŽĨƚŚĞ
ƚĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐǇ ?(Orlikowski & Gash, 1994, p. 180), ǁŚĞƌĞĂƐŝũŬĞƌ ?Ɛ (1995) technological frame 
inclƵĚĞƐĂůůĞůĞŵĞŶƚƐƚŚĂƚŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞƐŝŶƚĞƌĂĐƚŝŽŶƐǁŝƚŚŝŶƌĞůĞǀĂŶƚƐŽĐŝĂůŐƌŽƵƉƐĂŶĚĂƌĞ “ŶŽƚ
ŐŽǀĞƌŶĞĚďǇĐŽŐŶŝƚŝǀĞĂŶĚƐŽĐŝĂůĨĂĐƚŽƌƐĂůŽŶĞ ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? ? ?ǇďĞŝŶŐopen to a wider set of 
metaphysical, sociological and artefactual assumptions, IS researchers can enrich their 
theorizing efforts by adapting or inventing concepts that work for the IS context. 
Benefit#4 Focus on Core Concerns 
The Kuhnian paradigm positions the focus of the researcher on the concepts and core concerns, 
not on the epistemological or methodological concerns. A large part of the ƐĞĞŝŶŐƚŚĞ/^ĨŝĞůĚ ?Ɛ 
own paradigms emerge lies in asking the right questions and returning to the context of 
discovery rather than testing foreign theories in the context of justification. The reason why new 
interdisciplinary fields like Women's Studies are established was not because there were no 
concepts or theories about women. They were certainly addressed in other fields such as 
politics, psychology and sociology and even biology. The reason why it was established, about 
the same time the IS field was established as a doctoral program, was because the right 
questions about women concerning gender issues, race, class and sexuality in the multicultural 
context were not being asked by these other fields (Tobias, 1978). The focus shifts from 
methodological concerns to topical concerns, from justification to discovery. 
In the case of the IS field, there is much to be gained by going back to its roots, interrogating 
even the elements that seem trivial (Lee, 2010; McKinney & Yoos, 2010). Especially in an inter-
disciplinary field like IS that accepts input from numerous avenues, it is very likely that 
terminology from another discipline may be incorrectly used or at least limited by the confines 
of its originating discipline. ŝũŬĞƌ ?Ɛ^KdĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚŽĨĨĞƌƐŶŽǀĞůǁĂǇƐŽĨƌĞĞǆĂŵŝŶŝŶŐǁŚĂƚƚŚĞ/d
artifact could mean to the IS field, especially /d ?Ɛ emergent nature. The SCOT approach places 
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the focus of the study on the technology itself ? the IT artifact ? which has so far eluded IS 
researchers (Akhlaghpour, et al., 2013; Orlikowski & Iacono, 2001; Weber, 2003). The SCOT 
approach offers a way of unpacking both the social as well as the technical nature of technology. 
Recent efforts in IS suggest the plausibility of this novel approach. Using a similar approach, 
Iivari (2003) unpacks and positions IS as a category of the IT artifact. Riemer and Johnston (2014) 
applies practice theory and social construction to explore a non-dualist view of IT as equipment. 
Answers to these questions that interrogate the roots of the IS field go a long way in 
ascertaining whether or not their application in the IS context is appropriate. 
 
Benefit#5: A Judicious Application of Methodology 
The intent of this essay is not to disparage research methodologies, or their underlying 
philosophies. The caveat placed on methodology is the preeminence given to it over the core 
ĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐŽĨƚŚĞƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚƌĞƐƵůƚŝŶŐŝŶƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚƚŚĂƚĂƉƉĞĂƌƐ “ǀĂůŝĚ ?Žƌ “ƌŝŐŽƌŽƵƐ ?ďƵƚĂůǁĂǇƐ
leaving readers with the uneasy feeling that the research is not getting to the heart of the 
matter (Grover & Lyytinen, 2015; Lee, et al., 2014). By focusing less on its methods and more on 
ƚŚĞƐƚƵĚǇ ?Ɛ core concerns, the researcher is more likely to get to the heart of the matter. Instead 
of depending on epistemology to provide the creative thinking in science, all three components, 
metaphysical, sociological and conceptual together uncover a novel "way of seeing" 
(Masterman, 1970, p. 73) and those considerations in turn shape which methods work best. 
The question of finding a judicious application of methodology has concerned IS scholars as well 
as organization science scholars for some time. As the organizational sciences realize that their 
paradigm wars and restrictive paradigmatic views of research were detrimental to theory 
building (Gioia & Pitre, 1990), several multi-paradigm approaches were proposed to address the 
gridlock (Willmott, 1993). Metatriangulation (Lewis & Grimes, 1999) uses paradigms as 
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heuristics to help researchers explore theoretical complexity in the hopes of extending the 
scope, relevance, and creativity of organization theory. Multimethodology interventions in 
systems practices, especially if inspired from different paradigms (Mingers & Brocklesby, 1997), 
are claimed to better address the richness of the real world. 
Unfortunately, all these approaches stop short of addressing the preeminence given to 
epistemology. Following the organizational sciences, most of the discussions in the IS field 
revolve around finding a mix of the epistemology-method combinations ƚŚĂƚĐŽƵůĚ “ďǇƉĂƐƐ ?ƚŚĞ
incommensurability issue (Becker & Niehaves, 2007; Chen & Hirschheim, 2004; Mingers, 2001; 
Venkatesh, et al., 2013). These proposed solutions preserve the problems discussed earlier 
concerning epistemology and overstate its importance. Although there is a close relationship 
between metaphysics of the object of study and the epistemology for researching it, there is no 
direct one-to-one relationship between metaphysical paradigms and research methods. 
In investigating the social construction of plastics, Bijker (1995) applied what might be called 
positivistic methods of analyzing the physical characteristics of various early versions of plastic, 
documenting the temperatures and chemical makeup of alternatives, but at the same time 
applied concepts of interpretive flexibility and technological frames to arrive at conclusions as to 
which chemical and heat-treatment combinations produced the dominant plastic form we use 
today. Hypothetically, the technological frame could be applied in analyzing the perennial 
problems besetting IS development, where a large proportion of IS development projects 
continue to encounter some form of failure (Nelson, 2007). Analyzing all three paradigmatic 
components will provide researchers with  “multiple perspectives, to move beyond narrow 
considerations ? (Dwivedi, et al., 2015, p. 143). ŝũŬĞƌ ?Ɛ(1995) technological frame concepts 
offers an alternative conceptual paradigm for studying IS failures by structuring the interactions 
among the actors of each relevant social group (often called stakeholders in IS development 
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studies). This new paradigm avoids both technological imperative view of failure as well as the 
other extreme, organizational imperative view (Leonardi & Barley, 2008; Markus & Robey, 1988) 
As far as we know, such a rich perspective of IS development has not been taken up by IS 
researchers. 
Discussion: Disagreement on Paradigms within the IS 
field 
The discussion on paradigms has been contentious and as a result the IS community holds 
differing conflicting views about paradigms. ^ŽŵĞŽĨ<ƵŚŶ ?ƐĐƌŝƚŝĐƐĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌŚŝƐǀŝĞǁƐĚŽŐŵĂƚŝĐ
and relativistic while others consider his model restrictive and monistic.
 48 
Table 4: Different Views of the Kuhnian Paradigm 
Theme Against Paradigms For Paradigms 
The importance 
and significance of 
the paradigm 
concept 
Whether or not the Kuhnian paradigm 
concept is correctly adopted is 
inconsequential to IS research. A study of the 
history or philosophy of science have little to 
do with how the field conducts its research. 
The philosophy of science addresses not only the goals of research but 
also what science is, how it works, how to conduct their research and 
the justifications through which we build our knowledge. The 
understanding of paradigms make up a major part of the philosophy of 
science and will have lasting implications on the progress of the IS field. 
Nature of the 
paradigm 
The Kuhnian paradigm is monistic, rigid and 
deterministic (Banville & Landry, 1989; 
Whitley, 1984). It hands ovĞƌ/^ƚŽƚŚĞ “ƌŝŐŽƌ ?
ĂŶĚ “ŽďũĞĐƚŝǀŝƚǇ ?ŽĨĂŚĂƌĚƐĐŝĞŶĐĞůŝŬĞ
physics which is not suited for a pluralistic 
field like IS  
The Kuhnian paradigm concept freed the social sciences from the 
hegemony of the natural sciences (Fuller, 2000). His own critics 
consider him a relativist, not a monist (Popper, 1970; Shapere, 1971). 
The paradigm concept is a pluralist concept because Kuhn (1970b) 
ƐƚĂƚĞƐƚŚĂƚ “ƐĐŝĞŶĐĞŝƐŽďǀŝŽƵƐůǇƐĞůĚŽŵŽƌŶĞǀĞƌůŝŬĞ ?ĂƐŝŶŐůĞ
ŵŽŶŽůŝƚŚŝĐĂŶĚƵŶŝĨŝĞĚĞŶƚĞƌƉƌŝƐĞ ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? ? 
Relationship 
between theories, 
models and the 
paradigm 
Is a theory or a model a paradigm? If so, why 
are not all theories and models (e.g. TAM, 
UTAUT, Media Synchronicity Theory) 
paradigms? 
The theory or model plays a more specific role than a paradigm and can 
be a component of a paradigm. Thus, TAM and UTAUT is derived from 
the social-psychology paradigm that describes theories of attitude. 
Media synchronicity and the theory it sought to replace, media 
richness, are derived by combining a communications paradigm with 
the information processing paradigm. 
The metaphysical 
paradigm 
Positivism, interpretivism, postmodernism 
are paradigms. The Burrell and Morgan 
(1979) model of research describes the 
sociological paradigms of management. 
These philosophical approaches and worldviews of science are 
metaphysical aspects of the paradigm. They ignore the concrete 
problem-solutions that paradigms offer, limit the choices of paradigms 
(Deetz, 1996; Willmott, 1993) and misrepresent the Kuhnian paradigm 
concept (Lowe, et al., 2007) 
The sociological The Kuhnian paradigm is rationalistic and Kuhn was among the first to acknowledge the sociological dimensions 
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dimension of the 
paradigm 
ignores the sociological dimension of science 
and its nature as a social construction 
(Banville & Landry, 1989; Whitley, 1984) 
of science (Keat & Urry, 2010; Urry, 1973). The Kuhnian paradigm is the 
ďĂƐŝƐŽĨDĞƌƚŽŶ ?ƐƐŽĐŝŽůŽŐŝĐĂůĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐŽĨĚŝƐĐŝƉůŝŶĞƐ(Merton, 1973) 
Value of the 
paradigm 
dŚĞƚĞƌŵ “ƉĂƌĂĚŝŐŵ ?ŚĂƐďĞĞŶĂďƵƐĞĚĂŶĚ
misused, and has fallen into disrepute so 
much so that it no longer holds any value 
(Banville & Landry, 1989; Ein-Dor & Segev, 
1981) 
The paradigm term remains valuable. Numerous disciplines, especially 
the social sciences, have taken advantage the paradigm concept (e.g., 
Merton, Bloor, Berger and Luckmann, Ritzer, Bijker, De Mey, Boring and 
Minsky to name a few) 
Vague meaning of 
the paradigm 
term 
Masterman (1970) finds 21 meanings of the 
paradigm term and criticizes Kuhn (Banville & 
Landry, 1989; Whitley, 1984). Kuhn disagrees 
ǁŝƚŚDĂƐƚĞƌŵĂŶ ?ƐĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞ
paradigm. 
Masterman agrees with and supports Kuhn. Masterman (1970) 
ĞůĂďŽƌĂƚĞƐĨĂǀŽƌĂďůǇŽŶƚŚĞŽƌŝŐŝŶĂůŝƚǇŽĨ<ƵŚŶ ?Ɛparadigms. Kuhn 
ĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞƐDĂƐƚĞƌŵĂŶ ?ƐĚĞƉŝĐƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƉĂƌĂĚŝŐŵ P “ƐŚĞ ?ƐŐŽƚŝƚ
ƌŝŐŚƚ ? ?(Baltas, et al., 2000, p. 300) 
Many different 
versions (earlier 
and later) of the 
paradigm 
Kuhn contradicted his own early 
conceptualization of the paradigm. In effect, 
he made a U-turn. His notion of the 
disciplinary matrix is a different concept from 
the paradigm. 
Kuhn refined his definition of the paradigm in response to criticism. The 
original sense of the paradigm did not change. For clarification, the 
disciplinary matrix breaks down the original concept into several 
perspectives which together still emphasize the primary meaning of the 
paradigm as exemplar 
dŚĞƉĂƌĂĚŝŐŵ ?Ɛ
inextricable 
connection to the 
community 
The locus of the paradigm is the community. 
There cannot be a paradigm without a 
ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ?ƐƵŶĂŶŝŵŽƵƐĂƐƐĞŶƚ ?EŽŽŶĞŚĂƐ
control of these macro-social processes and 
therefore cannot individually or in a group 
establish a paradigm. 
There are many examples of paradigms in the sense of exemplars that 
ĞǆŝƐƚĞĚďĞĨŽƌĞƚŚĞĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇĂƐƐĞŶƚĞĚ ?Ğ ?Ő ?ŽƉĞƌŶŝĐƵƐ ?ƐĂŶĚDĞŶĚĞů ?Ɛ
paradigms to name a few and in the case when a paradigm is borrowed 
from other disciplines. Individual members or groups in a research 
community can play a major role in dethroning existing paradigms or 
establish a new paradigm by using the weight of evidence. 
Nature of the 
paradigm as 
A researcher cannot step out of his/her 
ƉĂƌĂĚŝŐŵƐŝŶĐĞĂƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĞƌ ?ƐƉĂƌĂĚŝŐŵŝƐƚŚĞ
^ƚĞƉƉŝŶŐŽƵƚŽĨĂŶĞǆŝƐƚŝŶŐƉĂƌĂĚŝŐŵŝƐǁŚĂƚ<ƵŚŶƚŽĂƐĂ “ƉĂƌĂĚŝŐŵ






implicit background of practice or of a 
worldview that the researcher is socialized 
ŝŶƚŽ ?ƉĂƌĂĚŝŐŵĐĂŶŶŽƚďĞ “ƵƐĞĚ ? ? “ĂƉƉůŝĞĚ ?
Žƌ “ĞǆƚƌĂĐƚĞĚ ?ĞŝƚŚĞƌĂƐĂƚŽŽůŽr a technique. 
(1970b) ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂůůǇŵĞŶƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚŝŵƉůŝĞƐƚŚĞ “ƵƐĞ ?ĂŶĚĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ 
paradigms  
Symbolic expression --  “/ŶŐƌĂŵŵĂƌ ?ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ? ?ĂŵŽ ?ĂŵĂƐ ?ĂŵĂƚ ?ŝƐĂ
paradigm because it displays the pattern to be used in conjugating a 
ůĂƌŐĞŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨŽƚŚĞƌ>ĂƚŝŶǀĞƌďƐ ? ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? ? 
Legal precedence  W  “ “ ?ĂƉĂƌĂĚŝŐŵŝƐ ?ůŝŬĞĂŶĂĐĐĞƉƚĞĚũƵĚŝcial decision 
in the common law, it is an object for further articulation and 
specification ƵŶĚĞƌŶĞǁŽƌŵŽƌĞƐƚƌŝŶŐĞŶƚĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐ ? ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? 
 “ ?ǁĂƐƌĞƋƵŝƌĞĚŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƚŚĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůĚĂƚĂƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĐŽŶĐƌĞƚĞ
applications ŽĨEĞǁƚŽŶ ?ƐƉĂƌĂĚŝŐŵĚĞŵĂŶĚĞĚ ? ?(p. 31). 
^ĞĞŶĞǆƚƌŽǁŽŶ “ƚŚĞƚŽŽůƐĂƉĂƌĂĚŝŐŵƐƵƉƉůŝĞƐ ? ? 
Creation and 
invention of a 
paradigm 
Paradigms are not created or invented. It 
cannot be prescribed or dictated. The 
paradigm is a post-hoc analysis of scientific 
practice that can only be identified in 
hindsight. It is not something that is likely to 
bring any change in scientific practices or 
conditions shaping those practices 
Scientists may not consciously set out to invent paradigms. Kuhn 
(1970b, p. 169) ĞǆƉůĂŝŶƐƚŚĞƉĂƌĂĚŝŐŵĂƐŚĂǀŝŶŐ “ĐŽŶĐƌĞƚĞƉƌŽďůĞŵ
ƐŽůǀŝŶŐĂďŝůŝƚǇ ?ǁŚŝĐŚĐĂŶŽĨĐŽƵƌƐĞďĞŝŶǀĞŶƚĞĚ ?^ŽŵĞƉĂƌĂĚŝŐŵƐĂƌĞ
identified in hindsight, but since paradigms are essentially social 
constructions, they can also be proactively worked on. We often come 
ĂĐƌŽƐƐƚŚĞĞǆƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶ “ŶĞĞĚĨŽƌĂƉĂƌĂĚŝŐŵƐŚŝĨƚ ? ?ǁŚŝĐƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƐĂ
proactive effort to change the existing paradigm. In the words of Kuhn, 
encouraging the invention of new paradigms was among the goals of 
writing Structure P “ŝŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶŽĨĂůƚĞƌŶĂƚĞƐ ?ƉĂƌĂĚŝŐŵƐ ?ŝƐũƵƐƚǁŚĂƚ
ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚƐƐĞůĚŽŵƵŶĚĞƌƚĂŬĞ ?^ŽůŽŶŐĂƐƚŚĞƚŽŽůƐĂƉĂƌĂĚŝŐŵƐƵƉƉůŝĞƐ
continue to prove capable of solving the problems it defines, science 
ŵŽǀĞƐĨĂƐƚĞƐƚ ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? ? ?^ĞĞĂůƐŽ<ƵŚŶ ?ƐƚŝƚůĞƚŽ “ŚĂƉƚĞƌ/y P  ?EĞĐĞƐƐŝƚǇ
ŽĨ^ĐŝĞŶƚŝĨŝĐZĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?. As Richard Mason et al (1997) cite of Francis 
Bacon notes: Histories make men wise; poets, witty; the mathematics, 
subtle; natural philosophy, deep; moral, grave; logic and rhetoric, able 
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to contend. 




Kuhn set out to write a commentary (he was 
an historian of science) of the progress of 
science, not to dictate or propose his own 
model for other scientists 
As a historian of science, by definition what Kuhn (1970b) did was post-
hoc. And his analysis, judged by the reaction it received, had and 
ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞƐƚŽŝŵƉĂĐƚĨƵƚƵƌĞƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ?ƐƚŚĞĂƉŚŽƌŝƐŵŐŽĞƐ “ǁŚŽĞǀĞƌ
does not learn from hisƚŽƌǇŝƐĚŽŽŵĞĚƚŽƌĞƉĞĂƚŝƚ ? ?^Ž ?ĂƐďŽƚŚ
ŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĂŶĂŶĚƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚĞƌŽĨƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ?<ƵŚŶ ?ƐǁƌŝƚŝŶŐƐĂŶĚĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇ
Structure are both commentaries and analyses of previous patterns of 
scientific progress as well as a proposal for future researchers. He 
begins his introduction to Structure by stating the need to move away 
from the linear incremental image of science towards his revolutionary 
ǀŝĞǁŽĨƐĐŝĞŶĐĞƚŚĂƚǁŝůůŚĂǀĞ “ƉƌŽĨŽƵŶĚŝŵƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐĂďŽƵƚŝƚƐŶĂƚƵƌĞ
ĂŶĚĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ? ?Ɖ ? ? ?ĂŶĚĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚŚŽǁƐƵĐŚĂŶhistorical study 
 “ĐĂŶƉŽƐƐŝďůǇĞĨĨĞĐƚƚŚĞƐŽƌƚŽĨĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂůƚƌĂŶƐĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶĂŝŵĞĚĂƚ





The received view within the IS community views the paradigm concept as an anathema, and 
considers the Kuhnian paradigm unsuited for the pluralistic IS field. Some even see little 
relevance of paradigms for the IS field. In Table 4 , we compare and contrast many of these 
conflicting assumptions that researchers may find discussed within IS circles. These assumptions 
or opinions may or may not be published and may be entirely anecdotal, but they represent the 
wide-ranging and conflicting views that beset the understanding of what paradigms mean to IS 
researchers. We therefore return to the goals of this paper mentioned in the introduction  W to 
raise the level of discourse surrounding paradigms in the field towards engendering more novel, 
interesting and relevant research and theorizing. We believe that by clarifying many sides of the 
debate surrounding the Kuhnian paradigm concept, the IS community will be better informed, 
be more able to uncover the hidden assumptions underlying their research, and be able to 
consider alternatives outside of their comfort zones. 
As Kuhn notes in Structure, paradigms can take the form of patterns, analogies and metaphors 
ĂƉƉůŝĞĚďǇƚŚĞƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĞƌƚŽƐĞĞƚŚĞ “ƌĞƐĞŵďůĂŶĐĞ ?ŐƌĂƐƉ ?ĞĚ ?ƚŚĞĂŶĂůŽŐǇďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚǁŽŽƌŵŽƌĞ
ĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚƉƌŽďůĞŵƐ ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? ? ?dŚĞǇĐĂŶĂůƐŽƚĂŬĞƚŚĞĨŽƌŵŽ ŵŽƌĞĐŽŶĐƌĞƚĞĞǆĞŵƉůĂƌƐƐƵĐŚĂƐ
scientific achievements that have captured the imagination of the research community, best 
practices of either academic or professional experts, classic textbooks or research studies that 
continue to inspire, and even IT artifacts or instruments that are adopted by specific 
communities. Thus, we argue for abandoning the practice of classifying, designing and 
evaluating research based on limited philosophical choices, specifically those modeled on the 
epistemological sense of the paradigm, and for the IS community to adopt a more 
transformative interpretation of the Kuhnian paradigm that incorporates all three metaphysical, 
sociological and conceptual paradigms. 
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Conclusion 
This paper seeks to illuminate an aspect of IS research that has become the received view within 
IS circles for many decades since it was first introduced in the late 1980s ? a distorted view of 
the paradigm that follows a monistic, rigid, restrictive one-dominant model of the natural 
sciences, unsuited for a pluralistic field like IS, and incapable of engendering disciplinary 
progress. This thinking, which found its way via the organizational sciences into the IS field, 
takes the shape of paradigms as epistemological and methodological worldviews, instead of 
shared exemplars of scientific achievements by the research community. The call for pluralism, 
which was offered as a solution to the alleged rigidity, involves applying alternative research 
methodologies or mixed methods. In the meantime, the transformative power of the paradigm 
concept with its exemplars, models, tools and techniques that place focus on the core concerns 
of the research and help researchers solve problems and hasten progress, is left largely 
unexploited by IS researchers. 
To unearth these potential heuristic elements of the paradigm concept, we reintroduce 
DĂƐƚĞƌŵĂŶ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌƉretation of the paradigm as consisting of metaphysical, sociological and 
artefactual/conceptual components. The metaphysical paradigm differs from the epistemology 
that IS researchers replace it with, and offers researchers numerous possible ontological views 
into the workings and mechanisms of their phenomenon of interest beyond just positivism, 
interpretivism or critical research. The sociological paradigm abstracts the multi-faceted sources 
of influences within the scientific community and inspires the future researcher from past 
scientific achievements, political attainments, legal precedence or linguistic nomenclature. The 
conceptual and artefactual paradigm offers paradigmatic applications, instruments and tools for 
problem solving, embedded knowledge from their practice, and examples of their 
accomplishments. 
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These aspects of the Kuhnian paradigm highlight the more practical and heuristic nature of 
scientific practice and demands from the researcher, not a passive sterile compliance with 
research methodologies, but an active engagement into theorizing and solving problems with 
the help of paradigms as exemplars. These concrete exemplars embed decades of knowledge 
and effort on the part of their prognosticators, and become by their nature, paradigmatic. This 
transformative view of the Kuhnian paradigm is far removed from the receive view of paradigm 
in the IS field; it admits diversity in views, focuses on the core concerns of the research and the 
achievements of its scholars and encourages creative, multi-faceted research. This re-
interpretation of the Kuhnian paradigm carries potential for a field with multiple specialty areas 
such as IS, each supported by its own history of research. Uncovering the hidden assumptions 
and Kuhnian paradigms behind the research allows the IS researcher to find alternatives to 
begin a new chapter that truly subscribes to the aphorism famously said by Newton "If I have 
seen farther, it is by standing on the shoulders of giants." 
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